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Author: MIME:rolesl@wellsfargo.com at INTERNET
Date: 12/4/97 6:22 PM
Priority: Normal
TO: Julie Dilley at AICPA3
Subject: FAS 125 Legal Opinions
Our Legal Department has just supplied me with a copy of an article, 
"Accounting for Securitizations Under FAS 125: Why Lawyers are Writing 
About It," from the September 1997 "Banking Law Journal."
I would urge you to make a copy available to the task force considering 
the proposed auditing guidance, as posted on the AICPA's web site, as 
the article specifically addresses whether a legal true sale opinion is 
an accurate yardstick in trying to determine whether "control" has been 
surrendered by the transferor. These insights may be valuable in 
reaching a conclusion on the role of this test as well as other aspects 
of a legal opinion for use in FAS 125
The article is authored by Walter G. McNeill and Daniel J. Mette, both 
of Weil, Gotshal & Manges (LLP) in New York.
Since the issue is interpreting the law and legal opinions, it would 
seem appropriate to invite members of the "securitization bar" to 
participate in any guidance contemplated on such matters.
Larry Roles
Manager of Accounting Policy
Wells Fargo & Co.
415-396-3325
Article not
reproduced in 
Web version
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Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
A PARTNERSHIP WHICH INCLUDES PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
425 Lexington Avenue 
New York, N. Y. 10017-3954 
(212) 455-2000
Direct Dial Numbeb Facsimile: (212) 455-2502 E-Mail Address
Telex: 129158
(212) 455-7140 M_Sigal@stblaw.com
December 11, 1997
Mr. Stuart Kessler
Chairman
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Proposed SAS73/FASB 125
Dear Mr. Kessler:
I am the Chair of the TriBar Opinion Committee.
TriBar has published reports on legal opinions since 1979 and 
is composed of members of the following bar associations: New 
York County, New. York State, City of New York, Allegheny 
County (Pittsburgh), Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Delaware, 
Ontario and Texas. TriBar's reports are published in the 
American Bar Association's Business Lawyer, including its 
Report on Opinions in the Bankruptcy Context: Rating Agency, 
Structured Financing, and Chapter 11 Transactions which is 
published at 46 Bus. Law. 717 (1991). Its newest report on 
Third Party Closing Opinions, which supersedes its original 
1979 report, will be published in the February 1998 edition of 
the Business Lawyer.
London Hong Kong Tokyo Singapore Columbus
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
Mr. Stuart Kessler -2- December 11, 1997
I have recently been furnished a copy of the AICPA 
proposed auditing interpretation of SAS 73 as it relates to 
FASB 125. I will distribute it to the TriBar members in 
connection with our January 13, 1998 meeting. Since TriBar 
and the American Bar Association's Legal Opinion Committee are 
two of the nationally recognized authorities on legal 
opinions, I would hope that the AICPA would afford both groups 
an opportunity to comment on the proposal as it would 
undoubtedly be beneficial for both the legal and accounting 
professions to have coordinated standards and practices in the 
important area of structured financing.
A copy of the TriBar membership is enclosed for your 
information.
Sincerely,
M. O. Sigal, Jr.
Enclosure
cc: Thomas L. Ambro, Esq.
Chair, ABA Legal Opinion Committee
Maury B. Poscover, Esq.
Chair, ABA Business Law Section
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley 
AICPA, Technical Manager (File 2605)
TRIBAR LEGAL OPINION COMMITTEE
Consisting of Representatives of:
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
New York County Lawyers Association
New York State Bar Association 
Boston Bar Association 
Delaware Bar Association 
Chicago Bar Association 
Toronto, Ontario Bar Association 
Atlanta Bar Association
Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) Bar Association 
State Bar of Texas, Business Law Section
Mike Sigal, Esq.
(Chair)
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett 
425 Lexington Avenue 
New York, New York 10017
Morton Moskin, Esq.
(Immediate Past Chair)
White & Case
1155 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Arthur Norman Field, Esq.
(Past Chair)
Shearman & Sterling
599 Lexington Avenue, 8th Floor
New York, New York 10022
December 1997
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Since 1979 the TriBar Legal Opinion Committee has 
issued reports on current opinion issues. Originally composed of 
members of the legal opinion committees of the New York County 
Lawyers Association, the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York and the New York State Bar Association, TriBar now also 
has representatives of the Boston, Delaware, Chicago, Toronto, 
Atlanta, Allegheny County (Pittsburgh), and Texas Bar
Associations.
TriBar's Reports are listed below:
Legal Opinions to Third Parties:
An Easier Path
34 BUS. Law. 1891 (1979)
First Addendum 36 BUS. Law. 429 (1981)
Second Addendum 44 BUS. Law. 563 (1989)
Opinions in the Bankruptcy Context 46 BUS. Law. 717 (1991)
The Remedies Opinion 46 BUS. Law. 959 (1991)
Use of ABA Legal Opinion Accord in 
Specialized Financing Transactions
47 BUS. Law. 1719 (1992)
U.C.C. Security Interests Opinions 49 Bus. Law. 359 (1993)
TriBar's current project is an update of its original 
1979 Report, which is expected to be published in the August 1996 
edition of the Business Lawyer.
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DALLAS
LOS ANGELES
Sidley & Austin
A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
875 Third Avenue 
New York, New York 10022
Telephone 212 906 2000 
Facsimile 212 906 2021
Founded 1866
WASHINGTON, D.C.
LONDON
SINGAPORE
TOKYO
WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER 
(212) 906-2272
December 12, 1997
Julie Anne Dilley
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2605
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: Proposed Auditing Interpretation -- Use of Legal Interpretations as
Evidential Matter to Support Management’s Assertion that a Transfer 
of Financial Assets Qualifies as a Sale -- Transactions Where Financial 
Asset Risk is Assumed by Sister Company
Dear Ms. Dilley:
I am a securitization attorney and I am writing to comment on the portions of the 
above-referenced proposed auditing interpretation (the "Interpretation") that address the required 
language set forth in item 1.12 of the Interpretation for "true sale" and "substantive consolidation" 
legal opinions to support management's assertion that transferred financial assets have been put 
presumptively beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other 
receivership.
As noted in item 1.01, quoting Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125, derecognition of 
transferred assets is appropriate only if the available evidence provides reasonable assurance that 
the transferred assets "would be beyond the reach of the powers of a bankruptcy trustee or other 
receiver for the transferor or any of its affiliates, except for an affiliate that is a qualifying special- 
purpose entity" (emphasis added).
In certain transactions where market (interest rate) risk or credit risk of a 
transferred asset is assumed by an affiliate of the transferor that is not a special-purpose entity, the 
"true sale" opinion rendered in the transaction depends on the corporate separateness of the 
transferor and the affiliate being respected. Thus, the true sale opinion may contain a qualification 
to the effect that the opinion giver "does not express any opinion as to any bankruptcy case in 
which the transferor is substantively consolidated with any of its affiliates."
::ODMA\PCDOCS\NEWYORK\28575\1
S idle y & Austin N ew York
Julie Anne Dilley 
December 12, 1997 
Page 2
An example of this type of transaction would be the purchase of subordinated 
Class B mortgage pass-through certificates by a sister company of the transferor of mortgage 
loans to a trust for securitization, until a sufficient quantity of Class B certificates has been 
amassed to make their sale in pooled form economically feasible. Another example would be the 
transfer of an asset-backed security to a trust which concurrently enters into a total return swap or 
modified total return swap with an affiliate of the transferor, in which some or all of the risk of a 
change in price of the transferred asset is assumed by the affiliate. (In this context, a "total return 
swap" implies full credit substitution, whereas the "modified total return swap" excuses 
performance by the swap counterparty if certain credit events occur with respect to the 
transferred assets.) In either example, it is my understanding that most securitization law firms 
would agree that, all other things being equal, (1) a "true sale" opinion is appropriate where the 
affiliate assuming the risk associated with the asset is distinct from, and neither controls nor is 
controlled by, the transferor, and (2) such opinion might not be appropriate if the transferor were 
to assume such risk directly (for example, by retaining the subordinated Class B certificates or 
entering into the total return swap agreement itself).
Item 1.12 of the Interpretation requires that an opinion be obtained that the 
transferor would not be substantively consolidated with the transferee to permit accounting for a 
transfer of financial assets as a sale. Some accountants have interpreted the Interpretation to 
require, in the context of transactions such as those described in the previous paragraph 
("assumed risk transactions"), that an opinion be obtained that the transferor would not be 
substantively consolidated with any of its affiliates (or, at least, with any affiliate which has 
assumed risk relating to the transferred asset) in a bankruptcy of the transferor or any such 
affiliate. This interpretation effectively reads into Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125, after the underlined 
words in the second paragraph of this letter, the phrase "including in the event that the assets and 
liabilities of the transferor and its affiliates are substantively consolidated in bankruptcy or 
receivership."
I cannot comment on the appropriateness of this interpretation as an accounting 
matter, but I wish to point out a difficulty that it raises in terms of legal opinion practice.
The current practice of securitization law firms in rendering substantive 
consolidation opinions has been to opine only with respect to the nonconsolidation of a transferor 
with a transferee which is a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity. These are the opinions that 
rating agencies have required and that are inarguably contemplated by SFAS 125. The special 
purpose entity typically has no business other than holding transferred assets for the purpose of 
securitization. It is subject to tight constraints on its operations and its relationship with the 
transferor. The purpose of these constraints is to make possible the rendering of a
nonconsolidation opinion.
::ODMA\PCDOCS\NEWYORK\28575\1
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If the Interpretation does in fact require that substantive consolidation opinions be 
given with respect to the transferor and its operating company affiliates who have assumed some 
risk associated with the transferred assets by acquiring subordinated interests in the assets or 
entering into swap agreements with the transferee, then one of two things will happen: law firms 
will alter their standards on what constitutes a sufficient factual basis to support a
nonconsolidation opinion in order to render such opinions, or "assumed risk transactions" of the 
type described will no longer occur (assuming, as is likely, that sale treatment is essential to the 
economics of such transactions).
Ending sale treatment of these transactions might be analytically correct within the 
framework of SFAS 125 if substantive consolidation were the norm when a member of a related 
group of operating companies enters a bankruptcy proceeding. However, the opposite is the 
case. Courts have generally treated substantive consolidation as the exception rather than the rule 
because of the possibility of unfair treatment of creditors who have dealt solely with the company 
having a surplus as opposed to those who have dealt with related entities with deficiencies. 
According to one important line of cases, if a creditor opposing substantive consolidation 
establishes that it has relied on the separate credit of one of the entities to be consolidated and it 
will be prejudiced by substantive consolidation, then consolidation may be ordered only if the 
demonstrated benefits of consolidation "heavily" outweigh the harm.
In conclusion, the interpretation put forward by some accountants with respect to 
the "affiliate assumed risk" transactions discussed in this comment, that an opinion must be 
obtained that the transferor and the affiliate which assumes the asset-related risk would not be 
substantively consolidated, should be carefully examined. It is likely to have ramifications broader 
than just the two transaction types discussed here. It would be helpful to legal practitioners if the 
final auditing interpretation could make clear whether this interpretation was or was not intended 
by the FASB 125 Audit Issues Task Force. If the Task Force takes no view on the issue so that 
its resolution is left to the judgment of the auditor, this would also be helpful to know.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
AWG/cjp
::ODMA\PCDOCS\NEWYORK\28575\1
Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P. 101 Hudson Street
Coopers Jersey City, NJ 07302
&Lybrand
  professional services firm
telephone (201) 521-3004 
facsimile (201) 521-3020
December 15, 1997
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Julie Anne;
I have read the proposed interpretation of AU section 336 entitled, The Use of Legal 
Interpretations as Evidential Matter to Support Management's Assertion That a Transfer of 
Financial Assets Qualifies as a Sale, and have the following comments thereon.
In keeping with the suggestion of the SEC staff, a footnote could be added to the end of 
paragraph .06, the text of which could read as follows: "If such a legal opinion was obtained 
prior to the effective date of this Interpretation (see paragraph .18), an update of that opinion also 
may need to be obtained to confirm that the requirements of this Interpretation arc met"
In footnote 3 to paragraph .12, I suggest changing the word "exclusion" to "omission".
I do not believe that footnote 4 to paragraph .12 adds anything, except for the specific reference 
to insurance companies and banks. Also, I object to the use of the word "generally" in that 
footnote. Therefore, I suggest that the footnote be deleted, and the phrase "(e.g., insurance 
companies and banks)" be added following the reference to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the last 
sentence of paragraph .12.
In order to clarify the applicability of a scope exception, I suggest modifying the last sentence of 
paragraph .17 to read, "...if permission for the auditor to use a legal opinion that he or she 
deems otherwise adequate is not granted, ..."
I would be pleased to discuss these comments.
Sincerely,
James S. Gerson
Coopers & Lybrand LLP. is a member of Coopers & Lybrand International, a limited liability association Incorporated in Switzerland.
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Andersen
Arthur Andersen LLP
December 15, 1997
1345 Avenue of the Americas 
New York NY 10105-0032 
Writer's Direct Dial
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley
Technical Manager, Audit and Attest Standards (212) 708-4129
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Julie Anne,
We have made much progress during the Task Force's deliberations. With the possible 
exception of the FDIC matter, we should be in a position to finalize the Interpretation on 
December 18.
My comments on the November 24, 1997 draft are as follows:
Reference Comment_____________________________________________________________________
Title Suggest changing:
... That a Transfer of Financial Assets Qualifies As a Sale 
to
... That a Transfer of Financial Assets Has Met the Isolation Criteria in 
Paragraph 9(a) of Statement of Accounting Standards No. 125.
Otherwise, an auditor may erroneously conclude if s not necessary to focus on 
paragraphs 9(b) and (c) of SFAS 125.
.04 and .05 Suggest switching the order of these paragraphs.
.06 Suggest the following changes:
... over an extended period of time-under that strueture, the auditor ...
... changes in relevant law that may change the applicability of ...
.09 Suggest the following change:
... of the assumptions that are used by the legal specialist, and make appropriate 
test of any information that management provides ...
DEC-15-1997 14:55 212 708 3878 96% P.02
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December 15, 1997
Reference Comment ___________________ ____________________________________________
. 10 Suggest the following change:
... content of the documentation that the legal specialist...
.11 Suggest the following changes:
... legal opinion that is restricted to particular addresses the facts and ...
... analogy to legal precedents that may not involve facts that are not fully 
comparable ...
.12 Once the FASB provides guidance on the FDIC situation or the FDIC clarifies its 
policy, the Interpretation should include an example of an acceptable opinion for 
an FDIC insured institution.
If the Interpretation is issued before the FDIC situation is resolved, a footnote 
should be added to explain the current FDIC situation and indicate that an example 
will be provided in an additional Interpretation once the situation is clarified.
Also, some (I am not sure what to say) interim guidance should be provided if the 
Interpretation is issued before the FDIC situation is resolved. It should address 
both 1997 and 1998 transactions.
.13 In the last bullet point, add "or a secured borrowing" after "a sale or."
.13, FN5 The Interpretation should describe the "limited circumstances."
I presume the Interpretation will be expanded and/or explained once the FDIC 
situation is resolved (see comment on paragraph .12).
.17 It is unclear how the auditor should determine if there is a GAAP departure or a 
scope limitation.
The Interpretation should indicate that in the absence of a conclusive "would" or 
"would not" legal opinion, the auditor always has a scope exception. Refer to 
Exhibit I for several examples that illustrate why this is appropriate. These 
interpretations are included to illustrate the issues; I'm not proposing that the 
examples be included in the Interpretation.
DEC-15-1997 14:55 212 708 3676 96% P.03
Arthur
Andersen
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley 
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Reference Comment
.17 FN7 The reference to Section 336.13 should be expanded to provide the non-technician 
guidance on what it's about and how it's relevant. The Interpretation should 
indicate that the auditor should request that the client attempt to obtain a second, 
acceptable opinion.
** * * * * *
I look forward to our meeting on December 18. Please feel free to call if you have any questions 
on my comments.
Very truly yours,
ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP
By:
David N. Thrope
DEC-15-1997 14:55 212 709 3676 96% P.04
Arthur
Andersen
Exhibit I
Illustration of Potential Scope Exceptions
Case Situation______________________________________________________ _____
1. Management attempts to, but cannot, obtain a legal opinion that meets the 
Interpretation's criteria.
2. Management chooses not to obtain a legal opinion because management 
desires borrowing treatment.
If management chose to, it could obtain an opinion that meets the 
Interpretation's criteria. (It's unclear how the auditor would know this).
3. Management obtains a legal opinion from a firm that the auditor determines 
is not sufficiently "qualified" to give the opinion.
The auditor does not know what opinion a "qualified" firm would provide.
4. Management obtains an opinion from legal counsel, which restricts it from 
being shown to the auditor.
The auditor has no basis to obtain (or rely) on the opinion, including using it 
to determine if there is a basis to conclude that there is a scope exception or a 
departure from GAAP.
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: November 24, 1997 Draft of Proposed AU Section 9336
Dear Ms. Dilley:
The Chase Manhattan Corporation ("Chase") is pleased to take this opportunity to 
comment on the November 24, 1997 draft of the proposed auditing interpretation (the 
"Proposal") by the FASB 125 Audit Issues Task Force (the "Task Force") entitled "The 
Use of Legal Interpretations As Evidential Matter to Support Management's Assertion that 
a Transfer of Financial Assets Qualifies As a Sale".
Chase has participated in the drafting of the comment letter to be submitted by The 
Bond Market Association relating to the Proposal (the "BMA Comment Letter") and 
supports the comments in that submission. In this letter, however, Chase seeks to focus 
greater emphasis on certain comments made in the BMA Comment Letter.
I. Preliminary Statement
As the largest bank holding company in the United States, Chase is an active 
participant in all aspects of the transfer of financial assets. Through October 31, 1997, 
Chase has managed, through its broker-dealer affiliate, Chase Securities Inc., approximately 
$32 billion in asset-backed transactions for 1997. In 1996, Chase was the second largest 
underwriter of credit card backed securities in the United States, acting as lead manager of 
$7 billion of such offerings. Chase has securitized a variety of customer receivables 
including credit card receivables, auto loans, retail loans, Eximbank guaranteed loans and 
equipment loans and leases.
CHASE
In addition, Chase underwrites, advises on or participates directly in structured 
transactions representing billions of dollars in principal or notional principal amounts. Each 
one of these transactions involves the transfer of financial assets, whether to a counterparty, 
a trust, a special purpose vehicle or otherwise. Generally, a legal opinion concerning 
various aspects of the transfer is also rendered. In rendering its opinion, counsel will have 
undertaken whatever due diligence it deems appropriate in advising its clients that the 
transferred assets have effectively been isolated from the transferor. While in certain 
instances, counsel may be able to advise without qualification that the transfer "would" be 
considered a true sale in the event of the insolvency of the transferor, such opinions are rare 
given the legal complexities inherent in a bankruptcy or insolvency situation, particularly 
where the transferor is a financial institution subject to the receivership of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC"). Because of the low level of bankruptcies of 
financial institutions engaged in asset securitization activities, there is insufficient case law 
to render such an opinion.
It should be noted that lawyers do not regularly issue formal legal opinions on 
bankruptcy law issues to nonclient third parties, and in the vast majority of third party 
opinions, bankruptcy is excepted from the scope of the opinion. See, for example, the 
Special Report of the TriBar Opinion Committee, Opinions in the Bankruptcy Context: 
Agency, Structured Financing, and Chapter 11 Transactions, 46 Bus. Law. 717 (1991). 
Conclusions as to the interpretation of bankruptcy law involve great uncertainty and heavily 
depend on the facts of a particular case and the broad discretionary powers of courts in this 
area. It is not surprising that bankruptcy opinions are recognized to be troublesome by the 
legal profession. Any requirement that legal opinions be required for auditors to determine 
the accounting treatment of transactions and the setting, by non-lawyers, of rigid criteria for 
the content and wording of such opinions is almost certain to lead to a stalemate between 
professionals of different disciplines in the context of specific transactions. Ruling that only 
an unqualified opinion will provide auditors with the reasonable assurance required by 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 125, Accounting for Transfers and 
Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities ("SFAS 125") could have 
the effect of severely limiting certain asset securitization structures.
Institutions such as Chase involved extensively in these activities will face a dramatic 
increase in legal expenses if counsel is required to perform sufficient due diligence to render 
an unqualified opinion. And, as noted above, it is not clear that legal counsel will ever be 
able to provide an unqualified opinion, regardless of the due diligence undertaken. 
Secondly, these transactions, particularly securitizations, are time sensitive, often requiring 
pricing within a day. To delay the completion of these transactions because counsel is not 
able to provide an unqualified opinion would have a serious impact on these transactions 
and the capital markets generally.
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II. Standard for Legal Opinions
A. Reasonable Assurance
Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125 states, in relevant part, as follows:
"The nature and extent of supporting evidence required for an assertion in financial 
statements that transferred financial assets have been isolated-put presumptively beyond the 
reach of the transferor and its creditors...depend on the facts and circumstances. All 
available evidence that either supports or questions an assertion shall be 
considered....Derecognition of transferred assets is appropriate only if the available evidence 
provides reasonable assurance (emphasis added) that the transferred assets would be 
beyond the reach of the powers of a bankruptcy trustee or the receiver for the transferor..."
Paragraph 23 therefore describes the standard - the "reasonable assurance" standard 
- to which the auditor must adhere in its determination of whether or not a transfer should 
be treated as a sale. SFAS 125 does not define "reasonable assurance". It is evident that 
the term does not mean "absolute certainty" or "slim possibility". In the context of the 
insolvency of a financial institution, there is no clear legal precedent governing the transfer 
of assets by such insolvent institution. The Proposal cannot create legal certainty where it 
does not exist. Because of the uncertainty in this area, Chase believes that the term 
"reasonable assurance" with respect to a transfer of an asset in this context means that it is 
more likely than not that the asset will be isolated from the transferor in the event of the 
bankruptcy of the transferor.
B. Paragraph 1.13 of the Proposal Rejects the Reasonable Assurance Standard
Paragraph 1.13 of the Proposal rejects as not persuasive most forms of what Chase 
would consider "reasonable assurance" in opinions rendered in connection with transfers of 
financial assets. For example, the following language is deemed to be not persuasive: "in 
our opinion, the transfer should (emphasis in the original) be considered a sale..." In 
rejecting this "should" opinion, the Proposal ignores the reasonableness and practicality of 
rendering opinions. As stated above, there is no clear legal precedent in this area. Unless 
there are several court cases reaching similar results, a reasonable lawyer will not give 
anything more than a "should" opinion because of the simple reason that the lawyer does 
not and cannot know the result.
Furthermore, Paragraph 1.13 of the Proposal also states that the following form of 
opinion is not persuasive: "There is a reasonable basis to conclude that". If the standard 
opinion of an auditor states "we believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for the 
opinion expressed above", it is difficult to understand the logic of the Proposal requiring a 
more stringent standard for an opinion by a lawyer.
Given the legal uncertainties and factual dependencies in bankruptcy situations, 
many lawyers resist giving any bankruptcy law opinions and the form of opinions which are 
obtainable in this area vary widely. In various ways, by a description of the lawyer’s
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reasoning or by express qualifications, they put the recipient on notice of the inherent 
limitations in the opinion. Lawyers may feel that their conclusions are most accurately 
expressed by one or more of the formulations that are disapproved in the Proposal. To 
rigidly limit the ways in which lawyers may address the limitations of bankruptcy law 
opinions may simply prevent such opinions from being rendered. This will result in delays, 
expense and conceivably missed business opportunities.
The rejection of these types of opinion is contrary to the concept of "reasonable 
assurance" contained in Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125; consequently, Paragraph 1.13 of the 
Proposal should be deleted. In conjunction with this deletion, the Task Force should 
expressly adopt the "more likely than not" standard by stating that an auditor has 
"reasonable assurance" that a transfer has met the isolation requirement set forth in 
Paragraph 9(a) of SFAS 125 if the auditor has seen a reasoned opinion by a lawyer that 
such transfer is more likely than not to be beyond the reach of the trustee in bankruptcy 
(i.e., there is a greater than 50% chance that the asset will be isolated from the transferor in 
the event of the bankruptcy of the transferor).
C. Severe Consequences if Paragraph 1.13 of the Proposal is Adopted
As stated above, it unlikely that many opinions can be given that will be acceptable 
under the Proposal if Paragraph 1.13 of the Proposal is adopted. As a direct consequence, 
transactions in the area of securitizations and structured products will be significantly 
reduced and, to the extent that such transactions occur, Chase and other financial 
institutions will incur extraordinary costs to consummate such transactions.
III. Use of Opinions by Auditors
Chase reiterates the position in the BMA Comment Letter relating to the use by an 
auditor of a legal opinion. Chase believes that a review by an auditor of an opinion should 
constitute "use" of the opinion. Any requirement that the auditor must be able to "rely" on 
the opinion would also cause increased costs and undue delays. Because "reliance" is not 
necessary for the auditor to perform its duties, the Task Force should expressly state that a 
review by an auditor of a legal opinion satisfies the requirements of the Proposal.
IV. Comment on Paragraphs 58 and 121 of SFAS 125
Chase strongly emphasizes the comments made in the BMA Comment Letter with 
respect to the importance of interested parties having the opportunity to comment on the 
issuance of any interpretations relating to Paragraphs 58 and 121 of SFAS 125. As stated 
above in the Preliminary Statement, Chase will be severely and adversely affected if changes 
are not made in the Proposal. If Chase had not been given the opportunity to comment on 
the Proposal, the Task Force would not have been fully aware of such consequences. 
Similarly, there may be other consequences that the Task Force should consider relating to 
any interpretations issued in connection with Paragraphs 58 and 121 of SFAS 125. 
Accordingly, it is imperative that Chase, as the parent of the largest bank in the United
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States subject to FDIC receivership, and other institutions insured by the FDIC be given an 
opportunity to comment on such interpretations before they become effective.
Chase appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Proposal. If you have any 
questions, please do not hesitate to call either Joseph L. Sclafani, Executive Vice President 
and Controller, at (212) 270-7559 or the undersigned at (212) 270-5015.
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Langer, John D__________________________ ___________ _
From: Langer, John D
Sent: Monday, December 15, 1997 3:04 PM
To: 'jdilley@aicpa.org’
Subject: FASB 125 Audit Issues Task Force Draft Auditing Interpretation
December 15, 1997
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley 
Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards 
File 2605 
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-3775
Dear Ms. Dilley:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the FASB 125 Audit Issues Task Force draft interpretation on "The Use of 
Legal Interpretations As Evidential Matter to Support Management's Assertion that a Transfer of Financial Assets Qualifies 
As a Sale." We believe that there are two places in the draft where the proposed language would establish a standard 
significantly more restrictive than the one enunciated in SFAS 125 itself.
The first of those occurs in paragraph .13 where several examples of opinion language are rejected - inappropriately in our 
view - as failing to provide persuasive evidence. The standard of certainty set by the FASB is that contained in paragraph 
23 of Statement 125 and quoted in paragraph 1 of the draft interpretation: the evidence must provide "reasonable assurance
that the transferred assets would be beyond the reach___ " We believe that the critical words in that phrase are "reasonable
assurance;" and we believe that the FASB used those words as they are commonly used in the English language: to indicate 
a level of confidence substantially less than certainty. The opinion language "there is a reasonable basis to conclude that.. 
." bears more than a coincidental similarity to the language FASB used. We believe that the task force, by rejecting this 
language as inadequate, is clearly rewriting the FASB Statement which it purports to interpret. We also believe that 
rejection of formulations such as "in our opinion, the transfer should be considered a sale..." or "in our opinion, it is 
probable that..." represents an unnecessarily narrow construction of the FASB guidance.
A smaller criticism of the phrases rejected by paragraph. 13 concerns the third of those phrases: "’we are of the view...' or 
’it appears,.We fail to understand the basis on which the task force rejects these phrases without regard to the language 
that follows them. Would the task force really reject, as inadequate, an opinion that stated that "we arc of the view that the 
transferred assets would be beyond the reach..." If so, on what basis?
The second portion of the draft that we regard as more restrictive than Statement 125 is the language in paragraph .17 
which warns that "since the isolation aspect of surrender of control is assessed primarily from a legal perspective, the 
auditor usually will not be able to obtain persuasive evidence in a form other than a legal opinion." With due deference to 
words like "primarily" and "usually," we believe this guidance will make it impossible for auditors to substitute other 
sources of comfort for legal assurance which, under the overly-harsh standard set by this interpretation, may not be 
available. The guidance contained in Statement 125 itself is much broader (again from paragraph 23): "all available 
evidence... shall be considered." We believe that the task force effectively reverses that guidance by stating that no 
evidence other than a legal opinion can be persuasive. Circumstances have been described to the task force which are not
Page 1
matters of law but which touch directly upon the isolation of assets from their seller: for example, public policy 
considerations which would, quite clearly, make it highly unlikely that a potential regulatory trustee would ever pursue 
substantive consolidation. We believe that the draft interpretation should state that, where comfort is available from such 
considerations, the auditor may be able to accept legal assurances which, in the absence of such considerations, might 
provide a less than adequate level of assurance.
We would be happy to address any questions you may have about these comments.
Sincerely,
John D. Langer 
Manager, Accounting Policies 
Salomon Smith Bamey
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BY HAND AND BY FACSIMILE
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2605
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: November 24. 1997 Draft of Proposed AU Section 9336
Dear Ms. Dilley:
The Bond Market Association (the “Association”)1 appreciates the opportunity to 
comment on the November 24, 1997 Draft of the Audit Issues Task Force (“AITF”) of 
Proposed AU Section 9336 (the “Proposal”) relating to the use of legal interpretations 
as evidential matter to support management’s assertion that a transfer of financial
The Bond Market Association (formerly PSA The Bond Market Trade 
Association) represents approximately 200 securities firms and banks that 
underwrite, trade and sell a wide range of fixed income securities, both 
domestically and internationally. Among other market activities, our members 
are active participants in transactions involving the securitization of financial 
assets, both domestically and internationally, as well as a variety of other 
transactions involving the transfer of financial assets (e.g., repos, securities 
lending, participations, structured products).
In its preparation of this letter, the Association has had extensive discussions 
with its primary members -- securities firms and banks — as well as its 
associate members -- accounting and law firms.
More information about the Association can be obtained from our website at 
www.bondmarkets.com.
December 15, 1997
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
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assets qualifies as a sale under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 125 
(“SFAS 125”) of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”).
We understand the AITF’s desire to issue auditing guidance about the kind of evidence 
required to support determinations made under Paragraph 9(a) of SFAS 125.
However, we believe that the Proposal’s auditing guidance would actually change the 
application of the accounting standards promulgated in SFAS 125; in particular, the 
Proposal would effectively void the standard of Paragraph 9(a) that requires that a 
transfer put assets “presumptively” beyond the reach of creditors. As interpreted in 
Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125, only “reasonable assurance” is necessary, and the FASB 
specifically states in SFAS 125 that certain transfers —which would not seem to 
meet the standard of the Proposal — shall be accounted for as sales. Neither the 
AITF nor the ASB has authority to establish, amend or interpret accounting standards; 
it must provide auditing guidance within the constraints established by the accounting 
standard-setter. Simply because the accounting standard-setter has, in the view of the 
auditing standard-setter, created a difficult framework within which the auditor must 
perform its function, does not justify a de facto change of any accounting standard to 
make it more auditor-friendly.
Although the Association appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Proposal in 
this letter, we note that the comment period was only three weeks and it occurred in 
the middle of the holiday season. The Association is concerned with the AITF’s 
apparent rush to finalize guidance, particularly in light of the significance that the 
Proposal would have for the financial markets.2 The Association is especially 
concerned with the AITF’s statement in the cover letter to the Proposal that it intends 
to issue final guidance, without any opportunity for comment, regarding Paragraphs 
58 and 121 of SFAS 125 (transfers by FDIC-insured institutions).3 The Association
The impact of the Proposal would go beyond banks and broker-dealers; many 
affected parties — accountants, auditors, lawyers, federal and state regulators 
and other preparers and users of financial statements — may not even be aware 
of the existence of the Proposal. The normal due process of the FASB would 
allow a studied and fair approach to the issues raised in the Proposal.
The AITF states in the cover letter accompanying the Proposal that it has 
initiated discussions with the FASB regarding Paragraphs 58 and 121 of SFAS 
125, and that it plans to include guidance based on the discussions in the final 
interpretation. We also understand that the AITF has requested that the FDIC 
confirm certain policies regarding how it might exercise its powers in case it 
became the receiver or conservator of an FDIC-insured institution.
THE
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
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believes it is critical that any guidance that would purport to change the accounting 
standard be issued in draft form with an opportunity for public and FASB comment.
The Proposal should be held in abeyance until it can be considered by the 
appropriate accounting standard-setter, the FASB, and if amendment or 
interpretation of SFAS 125 is appropriate, based on FASB review, then be the 
subject of the normal due process of the FASB.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Proposal sets a rigid and restrictive standard that is far more stringent than 
SFAS 125 itself By requiring “would" opinions in the case of transfers by entities 
subject to the Bankruptcy Code, 5 the AITF is arbitrarily going well beyond the
FDIC-insured banks may be directly and adversely affected by such guidance, 
and the AITF should not underestimate the potential negative consequences 
both to the institutions affected and the markets. Second, that guidance may be 
relevant to issues going beyond sales of assets by FDIC-insured institutions.
For example, there are many parallels between the treatment of various 
transactions in proceedings in respect of a U.S. broker-dealer under the 
Securities Investor Protection Act and the treatment of those transactions in 
FDIC conservatorship or receivership proceedings. A full exposure of the 
Proposal would allow interested parties to address all of the issues raised by 
the Proposal.
The Association does not address herein any issues regarding the specific 
nature of legal comfort that should be obtained in the context of transfers by 
FDIC-insured institutions, in light of the particular provisions of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act. As stated above, the Association believes that it is 
critical that any guidance regarding Paragraphs 58 and 121 of SFAS 125, 
particularly any guidance that would purport to change the accounting 
standard, be issued in draft form with an opportunity for public and FASB 
comment. Furthermore, although the Proposal seems to address specific legal 
formulations in the context of transfers by FDIC-insured institutions (see 
footnote 5 in the Proposal), the Proposal is ambiguous in this regard (see 
footnote 4 in the Proposal). The Association believes that, if the AITF 
disregards our comment that further public and FASB comment is necessary 
on the existing Proposal, it should at the very least make clear that the Proposal 
does not apply to transfers by FDIC-insured institutions, and then put any 
guidance on transfers by FDIC-insured institutions out for public and FASB
(continued...)
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"reasonable assurance ” standard of SFAS125 -- both the text of SFAS 125 and the 
FASB’s explicit and implicit treatment of various transactions in SFAS 125 set an 
accounting standard different from the accounting standard that the Proposal’s 
auditing guidance would purport to set. The Association is particularly concerned 
with the adverse market impact of the Proposal on sales of assets coupled with 
derivatives (such as structured products involving sales with total rate of return 
swaps), repos that currently qualify for sales treatment under SFAS 1256 and sales 
effected through participations.
The Association is convinced that the “would” opinion standard in the Proposal 
would significantly reduce market activity in transactions such as securitizations 
and other structured products. These transactions are used extensively by financial 
institutions to repackage financial assets and instruments to meet the demands of 
investors and are an important source of funding for many financial institutions. 
Furthermore, the “would” opinion standard would unnecessarily increase costs to 
firms that continue to enter into sales transactions that, due to the AITF standard, 
would be accounted for as secured borrowings — be they increased regulatory capital 
requirements or the costs arising from the perception that a firm has greater leverage. 
Because of these costs, firms may instead restructure certain transactions (including 
moving them offshore where possible)7 solely to achieve favorable accounting 
treatment.
The AITF’s “would” opinion standard is inconsistent with the accounting and 
auditing standards being applied in similar circumstances. In particular, EITF D-43
(...continued)
comment.
6 We do not address Paragraphs 9(b) or (c) of SFAS 125 herein. It is our 
understanding that a repo, if it met the requirements of Paragraph 9(c) (i.e., 
“control” is not maintained), could qualify as a sale of the underlying asset if 
the requirements of Paragraphs 9(a) and (b) were met; We also do not address 
the question of when a transaction is a “routine” transaction as discussed in 
Paragraph 1.04 of the Proposal, in which case legal opinions need not be 
obtained.
7 .....
In certain jurisdictions, the law may be clearer on true sale issues than in the 
United States. For example, English bankruptcy law (which would require an 
English transferor) is attractive, because it is our understanding that English 
law generally treats transactions documented as sales as sales.
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requires “reasonable assurance” based on “available evidence” that netting “would” be 
enforceable for a reporting entity to net off-balance sheet and repo exposures.
“Would” opinions are not being required to meet those standards.
There is no evidence that the FASB supports the formulaic and restrictive standard 
proposed by the AITF. Indeed, the Association understands that the FASB has 
specifically declined to impose a “would” opinion standard, let alone a legal opinion 
requirement in the first place.
The AITF’s stringent “would” opinion standard will result in inconsistency and 
asymmetry in accounting treatment and will promote opinion-shopping. Different 
reporting entities may account for the same transactions differently, and two entities 
may show the same asset on their balance sheets (and be required to maintain 
regulatory capital against the same asset); even though the law is the same, the firms’ 
counsel may have different views of the law or a different way of expressing their 
judgments. Although the Proposal recognizes that bankruptcy opinions are reasoned 
opinions,9 a reasoned “would” opinion standard does not recognize the diversity of 
opinion practice, particularly in non-U.S. jurisdictions, and will promote opinion­
shopping. A less restrictive standard will promote consistency and symmetry in 
accounting treatment and will reduce time-consuming and costly exercises in opinion­
shopping.
Although legal opinions may be an important source, a firm should be able to 
provide other available evidence — such as evidence of regulators' views — to 
support its assertion that the isolation criterion has been met. For example, the 
regulatory policies surrounding the relationship between regulated and unregulated 
entities may be persuasive evidence of the separateness of those entities in bankruptcy, 
notwithstanding the inability of counsel to give an opinion (due to the lack of case 
law) that, standing by itself, does not meet the reasonable assurance standard of SFAS 
125.
In this regard, any final guidance should make clear that it is limited to the 
issue of Paragraph 9(a) of SFAS 125.
A reasoned opinion generally means a qualified opinion in which counsel sets 
forth the analysis that forms the basis of its conclusion in the opinion itself. 
Opinions in the bankruptcy area tend to be reasoned opinions, because of the 
equitable powers of bankruptcy courts and the subjective and often difficult 
nature of the issues being addressed.
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The treatment of a sale transaction as a financing because of the restrictive 
standard in the Proposal could impair a purchaser’s rights in the event of a 
bankruptcy of the seller, A court might view a seller’s treatment of a sale transaction 
as a financing for financial reporting purposes as evidence that the transaction should 
be treated as a financing for bankruptcy purposes. The Association is especially 
concerned that a court might base its determination on the “seller’s” failure to meet the 
flexible language of SFAS 125, because the secured borrowing treatment was required 
by the Proposal. Such a result would be contrary to the intention of the parties and the 
otherwise likely outcome of the litigation.
The Association believes that the appropriate standard is less rigid than that 
proposed by the AITF, and that the “reasonable assurance” standard of SFAS 125 
can be met in a number of ways. Because of the equitable powers of bankruptcy 
courts and the fact-specific nature of the cases, legal comfort in this area is very 
subjective. Furthermore, different counsel have different standards in rendering 
opinions; these differences may be based on, among other things, a firm’s policies or 
the jurisdiction in which counsel practices. Instead of the imposition of an arbitrary 
and formulaic approach on auditors, a firm and their internal and external counsel,10 
auditors must have more flexibility in assessing legal comfort and should, where 
necessary, engage in a dialogue with counsel as to the level of the comfort to 
determine whether there is “reasonable assurance that the transferred assets would be 
beyond the reach of the powers of a bankruptcy trustee”. As stated in the topic 
sentence of Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125, “[t]he nature and extent of supporting 
evidence ... depend on the facts and circumstances.” The Association believes that 
the Proposal’s “check-the-box” approach is contrary to the case-by-case analysis 
envisioned by the FASB.
Even though the Association generally disagrees with a formulaic approach to legal 
comfort, it does believe that certain formulations of a lawyer’s conclusion should 
presumptively meet the reasonable assurance standard of SFAS 125 (although that 
presumption could be rebutted by contrary evidence) and some should not (absent
The use of the phrase “legal specialist” in the Proposal could be taken to mean 
that counsel must in all circumstances be an “expert” in bankruptcy matters. 
We believe that, where it is appropriate to consult counsel, in many 
circumstances that counsel does not have to be a bankruptcy expert. For 
example, an internal counsel may be familiar with a transaction and, although 
not an expert, would feel comfortable in providing his or her legal judgment as 
to the treatment of the transaction in bankruptcy.
December 15, 1997
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
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countervailing positive evidence). We discuss some specific formulations in the text 
below.
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The Association emphasizes, however, that a list of formulations should not 
straitjacket auditors and counsel, and that auditors should be entitled to make 
judgments in particular cases as to whether there is “reasonable assurance.” This is 
particularly important in the context of legal comfort from counsel in non-U.S. 
jurisdictions who may express conclusions in different language. The phrasing of a 
foreign lawyer’s conclusion might seem weaker than that of a U.S. lawyer, even 
though it is intended to be stronger (and vice versa). The Proposal would not seem to 
allow this critical flexibility.
Firms should not be required to obtain legal comfort for every non-routine 
transaction; instead, memoranda of law addressing non-routine transactions 
meeting certain assumptions should be acceptable so long as the assumptions in the 
memorandum can be “matched” to the actual transaction. The Association believes 
that auditors should have flexibility in this regard. In certain circumstances, the 
auditor may be able to determine that the memorandum encompasses the transaction, 
while in others the auditor may need assistance either from management or counsel in 
making that determination. If the auditor cannot determine that the transaction fits 
within the advice given in the memorandum, it would then seek additional evidence as 
appropriate. Again, the Association believes this flexibility is entirely consistent with 
the spirit and letter of SFAS 125.
Finally, the Association agrees that auditors entitled to seek legal comfort as evidence 
to support a firm’s assertions should be entitled to review that comfort and that certain 
limitations in a legal opinion would be inconsistent with the auditor’s use of the legal 
comfort. The Association does not believe, however, that a limitation on auditors’ 
“reliance” itself unduly restricts the use by the auditor of the legal comfort.
In light of our concern with the impact of the Proposal on the markets and our 
concern that the Proposal would change generally accepted accounting principles 
without the normal FASB due process, it is imperative that the next version of the 
Proposal, if any, should be put out for an extended period of public and FASB 
comment and that any guidance regarding Paragraphs 58 and 121 of SFAS 125 
should also be the subject of public and FASB comment.
December 15, 1997
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
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II. DISCUSSION
A. The AITF’s “Would” Opinion Standard is Far More Restrictive 
Than SFAS 125; SFAS 125 Requires Only Reasonable Assurance
Although the Proposal does not expressly state that a “would” opinion from counsel is 
required for a firm to meet the isolation criterion in Paragraph 9(a) of SFAS 125, it is 
the Association’s understanding that Paragraphs 1.13 and 1.17 of the Proposal make 
this requirement for “non-routine” transactions clear by negative implication. Under 
Paragraph 1.13, a “should” opinion would not provide persuasive evidence, and under 
Paragraph 1.17, an auditor will “usually” not be able to obtain persuasive evidence in a 
form other than a legal opinion.
The Association agrees that there is a significant degree of legal content to Paragraph 
9(a) of SFAS 125, and that legal comfort from qualified counsel may be an important 
means for an auditor to obtain evidence of a firm’s assertion that the isolation criterion 
has been met for “non-routine” transactions. However, we strongly believe that SFAS 
125 itself does not require, and the FASB has not interpreted SFAS 125 to require, that 
the legal comfort must come in the form of a legal opinion or that the comfort must 
meet an inflexible and stringent “would” opinion standard. Instead, SFAS 125 sets 
forth a “reasonable assurance” standard as to both form and substance that is to be 
applied in a case-by-case manner on the basis of all available evidence. The 
Association therefore believes that the Proposal would actually change generally 
accepted accounting principles, and we question the AITF’s authority to make such 
a change.
1. The text of SFAS 125 itself sets forth a standard much less 
restrictive than the “would” opinion standard in the Proposal
The Association believes that the text of SFAS 125 sets forth a lesser standard than a 
“would” or “should” opinion standard. The wording of the text of SFAS 125 can 
support a number of possible interpretations as to the level of comfort that must be 
obtained to meet the Paragraph 9(a) standard. Based solely on a textual analysis, one 
can make arguments for a variety of standards, ranging from a “would/should” opinion 
standard to a “more likely than not” standard.11 Given these “mixed signals”, it is
“Presumptively” (which in layman’s terms seems to be a relatively flexible 
standard) appears, of course, in Paragraph 9(a) itself and would seem to 
suggest a very low standard. The reference in Paragraph 57(a) to sales to 
SPE’s being “likely” to be judged beyond the reach of the transferor implies a
(continued...)
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unclear why the AITF chose the most restrictive interpretation, especially in light of 
the words of Paragraph 23 that seem to bear most directly on the question of the 
standard of the legal comfort:
The nature and extent of supporting evidence required 
for an assertion in financial statements that transferred 
financial assets have been isolated ... may include 
making judgments about... whether a transfer of 
financial assets would likely be deemed a true sale at law 
.... Derecognition of transferred assets is appropriate 
only if the available evidence provides reasonable 
assurance that the transferred assets would be beyond 
the reach of the powers of a bankruptcy trustee....
(Emphasis added.)
The Association believes that Paragraph 23 itself sets forth the appropriate standard; 
that standard is a “would likely/reasonable assurance” standard and not a “would” 
opinion standard.
To the extent that there is textual ambiguity, however, the Association believes that 
one can go beyond the mere words of SFAS 125 and look to the FASB’s explicit and 
implicit treatment of various transactions in SFAS 125. The lengthy accounting 
guidance given by the FASB in SFAS 125 in connection with repos, participations and 
other trading transactions strongly supports the view that a “reasonable assurance” 
standard (and certainly not an inflexible “would” standard) is the appropriate standard.
2. A “Would” Opinion Standard is Contrary to the FASB’s 
Treatment of Repos and other Transactions in SFAS 125.
Paragraph 24 of SFAS 125 indicates that “many common financial transactions, 
for example, typical repurchase agreements and securities lending transactions, 
isolate transferred assets from the transferor, although they may not meet the other
(...continued)
“more likely than not” standard. On the other hand, the reference in Paragraph 
118 to assurances acceptable to rating agencies implies a “would/should” 
standard (as discussed below, the rating agencies will often accept “should” 
opinions). Notably, Paragraph 118 does not form an integral part of SFAS 
125, as it is contained in Appendix B (unlike Paragraphs 22 through 84, which 
are contained in Appendix A).
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criteria for surrender of control.”12 Furthermore, Paragraph 68 states that “... 
transfers ... that shall be accounted for as sales include transfers with agreements to 
repurchase at maturity and transfers with repurchase agreements in which the 
transferee has not obtained collateral sufficient to fund substantially all of the cost of 
purchasing replacement assets.” (Emphasis added.)13
The FASB’s statement that repos would qualify for isolation under Paragraph 9(a) 
is inconsistent with the view that a “would” opinion is required for derecognition. 
Indeed, the FASB recognizes that repos are “ambiguous” and “difficult to 
characterize”.14 Transactions that are “ambiguous” are hardly susceptible to the 
receipt of the definitive legal comfort required by “would” opinions. Rather, the
The minutes of the March 27, 1996 meeting of the FASB indicate that:
“Mr. Bullen recommended that the final Statement note in Appendix A that 
certain transactions meet criterion 9a. even though they may not meet the other 
control criteria, for example, repurchase agreements, securities lending 
transactions, and loan participations. He stated that would help accountants 
and preparers understand the criterion. No Board members disagreed with the 
staff recommendation.” (Emphasis added.)
See also Paragraph 138 of SFAS 125: “if judged by the criteria in paragraphs 
9(a) and 9(b). . ., financial assets transferred under typical repurchase ... 
agreements would qualify for derecognition as having been sold for proceeds 
consisting of cash and a forward purchase contract.”
We understand that the AITF believes that the “would” opinion standard is 
required by Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125 (even though that Paragraph, as 
discussed above, speaks of “reasonable assurance” that a transfer “would” be 
considered a sale). Notably, Paragraphs 24 and 68 are of the same importance 
in interpreting SFAS 125 as Paragraph 23; each is in Appendix A 
(“Implementation Guidance”) and each is an “integral part of the standards 
provided in” SFAS 125 (Paragraph 22). We assume that no legal opinion or 
other comfort would be required if transactions described in Paragraph 68 are 
treated as sales in accordance with the prescriptions established by the FASB 
in that Paragraph.
Paragraphs 135 and 142 of SFAS 125.14
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FASB’s statement that typical repos are “generally” treated as sales in bankruptcy is 
entirely consistent with a “reasonable assurance” standard.
Similarly, the FASB seemed clearly to contemplate that participations would qualify 
for derecognition in many circumstances (see Paragraphs 74-76), yet even well- 
drafted participations sold without recourse can pose creditors’ rights issues.15 16 
Again, this strongly supports the conclusion that the Proposal’s “would” opinion 
requirements go well beyond SFAS 125.17
15 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in an amicus brief filed with the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Nebraska Dept. of Rev. v. Lowenstein. 115 S.Ct. 557 
(1994), a recent tax case involving repos, cautioned the Court that 
“characterization of repos is a dangerous process.” Repos are hybrid 
transactions that are often characterized differently for different purposes (i.e., 
commercial law, tax and bankruptcy). Because of the difficulty in 
characterizing repos as either purchases and sales or secured borrowings for 
bankruptcy purposes, special bankruptcy protections have been enacted in 
order to protect the functioning of a vitally important financial market. In light 
of this difficulty, it is very unlikely that any legal specialist would be able to 
provide a “would” opinion that a repo constitutes a true sale. The fact that the 
FASB, obviously keenly aware of the “difficult to characterize” nature of 
repos, would state that they meet the isolation criterion of Paragraph 9(a) is 
strong evidence that a “would” level of legal assurance was not intended by the 
FASB to be the standard for isolation.
16 Participations have been the subject of a great deal of insolvency case law, 
principally involving banks. Although most of that case law indicates that, 
where a lead lender sells a participation without recourse, the underlying asset 
(or portion thereof subject to the participation) is not property of the lead’s 
estate, the case law is not entirely uniform. In addition, if the underlying 
borrower has a deposit with the lead, it can set off its obligations under the loan 
against the deposit obligations of the lead, notwithstanding the participation of 
the loan (and to the detriment of the participant). This legal landscape seems 
inconsistent with a “would” opinion standard, yet the FASB seemed clearly to 
contemplate that participations would qualify under Paragraph 9(a) of SFAS 
125.
17 Outside of the context of repos and participations, the majority of examples in 
SFAS 125 suggest that many transactions that would not meet a “would” 
opinion requirement should nonetheless meet the isolation standard of 
Paragraph 9(a). See Paragraphs 6, 32, 41 and 46, which imply that a put
(continued...)
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3. A “would” opinion standard would be inconsistent with other 
similar accounting standards
EITF D-43, which interprets FIN 39 (and FIN 4118) states that “[o]ffsetting is 
appropriate only if the available evidence, both positive and negative, indicates that 
there is reasonable assurance that the right of setoff would be upheld in bankruptcy.” 
This standard is remarkably similar to that in Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125.19 We do not 
believe that “would” or “should” opinions are, or have been, required to meet the FIN 
39 and FIN 41 standards, but instead that the standard has been applied flexibly and 
that memoranda or other legal diligence, together with other available evidence, 
conveying a “would likely” confidence level have been viewed as sufficient.
EITF D-43 also states that “all of the information that is available, either supporting or 
questioning enforceability, should be considered.” Again, this is remarkably similar to 
the statement in Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125 that “[a]ll available evidence that either 
supports or questions an assertion shall be considered.” Implicitly in both of these 
standards, information questioning enforceability is not necessarily inconsistent with 
reasonable assurance; on the other hand, it might well be inconsistent with a “would” 
or “should” opinion.21
(...continued)
should be treated the same whether written by the seller of the subject asset or 
a third party and that sales of loans with recourse should be treated as sales. 
When a put is issued by a seller of an asset or when loans are sold with 
recourse, there may well be true sale issues inconsistent with “would”-level 
comfort.
18 The FIN 39 standard is incorporated into FIN 41 (netting of repos).
19 Of course, the AITF Proposal would only apply to determinations under 
Paragraph 9(a) of SFAS 125. In light of the similarity of wording between 
Paragraphs 23 of SFAS 125 and EITF D-43, however, the Association believes 
that the AITF should make the limited application of the Proposal clear in any 
final guidance.
20 For example, we believe that firms have supported offsetting with certain 
counterparties on the basis of regulatory pronouncements or realities, even if 
there is no traditional legal comfort that offsetting would be enforceable.
21 The “all available evidence” standard of diligence that balances positive and
(continued...)
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Notably, there appear to be substantial similarities between the reasonable assurance 
required for netting under FIN 39 and FIN 41 and derecognition under SFAS 125 -- in 
addition to the similarities in language, FIN 39, FIN 41 and SFAS 125 go to the legal 
underpinnings for accounting treatment and rely in large part on counsel’s judgments 
as to difficult-to-evaluate bankruptcy issues.* 22 The Association believes that the 
flexibility that has been applied in implementing FIN 39 and FIN 41 is appropriate 
and consistent with the spirit and letter of EITF D-43; the AITF should apply the 
spirit and letter of SFAS 125 similarly.
4. The FASB has declined to mandate a “would” standard
SFAS 125 never states that legal opinions should be required or that a “would” or 
“should” standard is required. Furthermore, we understand that several of the 
Association’s members and counsel have since the publication of SFAS 125 
participated in meetings with members and staff of the FASB and that the FASB has 
declined to indicate that opinions would be required or that they would have to meet a 
“would” standard.
(...continued)
negative evidence is echoed in SFAS 109 (Accounting for Income Taxes). 
Paragraph 20 of SFAS 109 states that “[a]ll available evidence, both positive 
and negative, should be considered to determine whether, based on the weight 
of that evidence, a valuation allowance is needed.” The Summary further 
states that “[j]udgment must be used in considering the relative impact of 
negative and positive evidence.... The more negative evidence that exists (a) 
the more positive evidence is necessary and (b) the more difficult it is to 
support a conclusion that a valuation allowance is not needed.” Again, the 
balancing of positive and negative evidence, when applied to a lawyer’s 
judgment, may well be inconsistent with a “would” or “should” opinion.
22 The other area in which counsel’s judgments are often used as evidence to 
support accounting conclusions is under SFAS 5 (Accounting for 
Contingencies). Paragraph 36 of SFAS 5 indicates that, among other factors, 
the “opinions or views” of legal counsel should be considered. The 
Association believes that, although the language of Paragraph 36 of SFAS 5 is 
not so nearly identical to Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125 as are EITF D-43 and 
Paragraph 20 of SFAS 109, it conveys the same message: auditors must be 
flexible in evaluating legal evidence in evaluating a firm’s assertions.
December 15, 1997
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The Proposal’s rigid and stringent “would” opinion standard thus goes far beyond 
SFAS 125 and the intention of the FASB. The Proposal’s standard is inconsistent 
with the explicit and implicit treatment by the FASB of various transactions in 
SFAS 125, is inconsistent with other similar accounting standards and has never 
been endorsed by the FASB. The Association does not believe that the AITF has 
the authority to make this change to generally accepted accounting principles, and 
believes that any final guidance must be the subject of an opportunity for an 
extended period of public and FASB comment.
B. A “Would” Standard Would Not Change the Law or Make the
Law Clearer and Would Result in Inconsistency and Asymmetry of 
Accounting Treatment and Will Promote Opinion-shopping
A lawyer’s opinion as to whether a sale of financial assets will be respected as such in 
a bankruptcy will not, of course, necessarily produce that result. Instead, a lawyer’s 
opinion (particularly in the case of bankruptcy opinions) is more in the nature of a 
prediction, based to the extent possible on prior case law, of how a court is likely to 
view the particular facts of a transaction. Because of the predictive nature of legal 
comfort, and because different counsel have different standards in rendering 
opinions, a strict “would” opinion standard would promote inconsistency, 
asymmetry and opinion-shopping. On the same facts, different counsel may well 
come to different conclusions; some counsel may reach a “would” level of comfort, 
others may not. A “reasonable assurance” standard would result in greater 
consistency and comparability and still provide a strong degree of legal comfort that 
transferred assets have been placed beyond the reach of creditors; the differing 
approaches of counsel would be more likely to satisfy this flexible standard and 
different firms would be more likely to account for similar transactions in the same 
way.
A less restrictive standard will not only promote consistency, it will promote 
symmetry (one of the principal goals of the financial components approach of SFAS
There is a wide range of opinion practices in the United States. For example, 
some counsel do not even believe there is a difference between a “would” and 
a “should” opinion while others do. The AITF’s Proposal fails to recognize 
this diversity.
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125); assets will not be shown on two firms’ balance sheets at the same time and only 
one firm will have to maintain regulatory capital against those assets. Furthermore, it 
will reduce opinion-shopping; the Proposal’s “would” standard would cause firms to 
consider searching for counsel that is willing to render a “would” opinion in lieu of 
counsel that, in the same transaction, would not.
These issues are likely to be exacerbated in the case of transfers of financial assets by 
non-U.S. affiliates of U.S. reporting firms. Because the AITF’s Proposal does not 
recognize the diversity of legal opinion practice even in the U.S. context, it will likely 
have an even more adverse effect in non-U.S. jurisdictions where the distinctions 
drawn by lawyers in the U.S. between “would” and “should” are likely to be foreign. 
The Association believes that the AITF must not underestimate the impact of the 
Proposal on the ever-increasing amount of asset securitization and other sales 
transactions that are being done by foreign affiliates of U.S. reporting firms. The legal 
formulas used in the United States should not be imposed on non-U.S. counsel by 
virtue of auditing practices. A more flexible and less formulaic standard would 
accommodate the practices of non-U.S. lawyers providing comfort in non-U.S. 
transactions.
C. Traditional Legal Comfort (Opinions and Memoranda of Law) 
Should Not Be the Only Form of Persuasive Evidence
Paragraph 1.17 of the Proposal states that “the auditor usually will not be able to 
obtain persuasive evidence in a form other than a legal opinion.” The Association 
believes that although traditional legal comfort (whether in the form of an opinion or a 
memorandum of law24) may in many circumstances be an important element in the 
auditor’s determination, in many circumstances other evidence may be persuasive.
The Proposal does not give adequate recognition to the forms of “available evidence” 
that Paragraph 23 of SFAS requires a firm to consider in “making judgments” 
regarding a transfer. The very first sentence of Paragraph 23 states that the “nature 
and extent of supporting evidence” . . . “depend on the facts and circumstances.”
For example, in the case of a sale by a broker-dealer to a third party executed 
simultaneously with a derivatives contract between the third party and an affiliate of 
the seller, the issue of substantive consolidation in bankruptcy between the seller and 
its affiliate could be relevant to the question of isolation; if the seller and the affiliate 
were consolidated, counsel might not be able to provide reasonable assurance
We discuss our views on opinions versus memoranda of law below.24
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regarding true sale issues. If the affiliate is not a special purpose entity, counsel might 
find it difficult to render an opinion that the seller and the affiliate should not be 
consolidated in light of the highly fact-intensive nature of substantive consolidation 
analysis and the non-special purpose nature of the affiliate in question. Nonetheless, a 
firm may be able to obtain comfort that does not take the form of traditional legal 
comfort, because it is not based on case law, that provides persuasive evidence to the 
auditors. For example, in the case of a broker-dealer seller, evidence of the regulators’ 
views would be highly probative of the likelihood of consolidation (or the likelihood 
of litigation), yet would not form the basis of a legal opinion.25
Of course, evidence of the regulators’ views should not be viewed in isolation, and 
should be evaluated along with any legal comfort obtained; together, they might 
provide reasonable assurance that the assets would be beyond the reach of the 
transferor or they might not. The fact, however, that the legal comfort alone does not 
provide such assurance should not preclude the totality of the evidence from providing 
such assurance.
D. The Treatment of a Sales Transaction as a Financing Could Impair 
a Purchaser’s Rights in the Event of a Bankruptcy of the Seller.
A court might view a seller’s treatment of a transaction structured as a sale as a 
financing for financial reporting purposes as evidence that the transaction should be 
treated as a financing for bankruptcy purposes. Because of the “disconnect” between 
SFAS 125 and the Proposal, the Association is especially concerned that a court might 
base its determination on the express language of SFAS 125 rather than the proposed 
“auditing” standard in concluding that the seller could not even provide reasonable 
assurance that the transfer would be viewed as a sale in bankruptcy. For example, if 
counsel could render a conclusion that it would be likely that a sale of an asset coupled 
with a total rate of return swap would be treated as a sale of the asset, yet the transfer
Footnote 2 of the Proposal is thus unsatisfactory, in that implies that the legal 
specialist should consider applicable regulatory policies in arriving at a legal 
conclusion. Indeed, a legal specialist may find it inappropriate to base any 
legal conclusion on the policies of a regulator. Our point is that regulatory 
policy, which may have a significant bearing on the probable outcome of any 
litigation or whether litigation is even brought, is not susceptible to traditional 
legal comfort yet is very relevant to, if not determinative of, the issue of 
isolation.
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was accounted for as a secured borrowing, it is possible that in a bankruptcy of the 
seller, the seller’s accounting treatment of the transaction would be used against the 
purchaser (who would, of course, take the position that the transaction was a sale).
The Association has been involved in several efforts to clarify the treatment in 
bankruptcy of various financial transactions to comport with the parties’ expectations 
as to the treatment of those transactions (for example, the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code protecting the rights of purchasers of assets under repos).26 The Association is 
very concerned that the AITF’s Proposal would undercut these efforts and would 
produce perverse results.
E. The “Reasonable Assurance” Standard is Not a Formula and Can 
Be Met in a Number of Ways
Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125 clearly indicates that meeting the isolation standard of 
Paragraph 9(a) is not a matter of checking a box. Instead, it is a facts-and- 
circumstances endeavor that is designed to provide reasonable assurance that an asset 
would be beyond the reach of creditors. The Proposal attempts, on the other hand, to 
force lawyers’ conclusions into a narrow and inflexible formula. Because of the 
equitable powers of bankruptcy courts and the fact-specific nature of bankruptcy cases, 
legal comfort in this area is inherently very subjective. Furthermore, different counsel 
have different standards in rendering opinions. While the Association understands 
that the AITF believes that the Proposal would be easy to implement, it simply ignores 
the reality of the uncertainty in this area. Instead of the imposition of an arbitrary and 
formulaic approach on auditors and counsel, auditors should be able to exercise 
judgment in assessing legal comfort and should, if necessary or appropriate, engage
More recently, the Association has been working with the President’s Working 
Group to make several changes to U.S. bankruptcy and insolvency laws. See 
in this regard “Financial Transactions in Insolvency: Reducing Legal Risk 
Through Legislative Reform”, a position paper prepared jointly by the 
Association and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. 
(April 2, 1996).
For instance, some counsel may be comfortable giving a legal conclusion in a 
highly subjective area if they believe that they will not be liable for negligence 
in rendering that conclusion. Other counsel may instead require affirmative 
case law support for a conclusion. Some counsel may be more concerned with 
reputational issues than other counsel. These are just some examples of the 
different considerations that different legal specialists consider in approaching 
opinion practice.
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in a dialogue with counsel to ascertain the level of counsel’s comfort to determine 
whether the “reasonable assurance” standard of SFAS 125 has been met.
Even though the Association generally disagrees with a formulaic approach to legal 
comfort, it does believe that certain formulations of a lawyer’s conclusion should 
presumptively meet the reasonable assurance standard of SFAS 125 (although that 
presumption could be rebutted by contrary evidence). For example, the Association 
believes that the following formulations (most of which are taken from Paragraph 1.13 
of the Proposal) of counsel’s conclusions would presumptively provide persuasive 
evidence that the isolation criterion has been met:
28• “In our opinion, the transfer should be considered a sale.”
  29
• “We are of the view that a court would ...”
• “There is a reasonable basis to conclude that...”
• “We believe a court would likely...”
• “Although the matter is not free from doubt, it is our opinion that a court would ...”
Similarly, the Association believes that certain formulations of a lawyer’s conclusion 
from Paragraph 1.13 of the Proposal should presumptively not provide persuasive 
evidence that the isolation criterion has been met (unless other available evidence 
supports isolation):
• “We are unable to express an opinion.”
Some rating agencies will accept “should” opinions in certain circumstances 
(e.g., in opinions regarding substantive consolidation); thus, even under the 
most restrictive view of SFAS 125, “should” level comfort should constitute 
persuasive evidence. This conclusion is supported by the view of some, but 
not all, U.S. counsel that there is no difference between a “would” and 
“should” opinion.
As noted above, we do not address in this letter the level of comfort that should 
be acceptable in the case of transfers by FDIC-insured banks (such as the 
“either there is a sale or there is a perfected security interest” opinions 
routinely rendered to the rating agencies in securitizations by FDIC-insured 
institutions). Again, we believe it is critical that the public and the FASB be 
given an opportunity to comment on any guidance in this regard.
The AITF’s proposed acceptance of counsel’s “belief" (see Paragraph 1.12) but 
not its “view” (see Paragraph 1.13) seems counterintuitive.
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• “It is our opinion, based upon limited facts...”
• “In our opinion, there is a reasonable possibility...”
• “It is our opinion that the company will be able to assert meritorious arguments...”
The Association emphasizes, however, that these formulations should not box auditors 
and counsel in, and that auditors should be entitled to make judgments in particular 
cases as to whether there is “reasonable assurance.” The auditor’s judgment should be 
made on a case-by-case basis, and the fact that a formulation is not listed above (or in 
Paragraph 1.12) should not automatically mean that it does not provide reasonable 
assurance as to isolation.
This is particularly important in the context of legal comfort from counsel in non-U.S. 
jurisdictions who may express conclusions in different language. The Association 
believes it is simply inappropriate for the AITF to export U.S. linguistic norms to non- 
U.S. counsel and that the Proposal must allow for greater flexibility in this regard.
F. Legal Comfort Can Take the Form of a Memorandum of Law and 
Does not Have to be Obtained for Every Non-Routine Transaction
Paragraph 1.13 of the Proposal states that “conclusions about hypothetical transactions 
may not be relevant to the transaction that is the subject of management’s assertions. .
. . [C]onclusions about hypothetical transactions may not contemplate all of the facts 
and circumstances or the provisions in the agreements of the transaction that is the 
subject of management’s assertions, and generally would not provide persuasive 
evidence.” The footnote to this statement reads as follows: “a memorandum of law 
from a legal specialist usually analyzes (and may make conclusions about) a 
transaction that may be completed subsequently. Such memorandum generally would 
not provide persuasive evidence, unless the conclusions conform with this 
interpretation and a legal specialist opines that such conclusions apply to a completed 
transaction that is the subject of management’s assertion.”30
The Association believes that the lack of flexibility reflected in Paragraph 1.13 is 
inconsistent with SFAS 125 and that it is unnecessary for firms to incur the expense 
associated with a legal opinion for every transaction in order for auditors to become 
comfortable with management’s assertions regarding Paragraph 9(a) of SFAS 125. 
While we agree with the concept that some diligence needs to be done to ensure that a
We agree with the statement in the footnote, to the extent it implies that a 
memorandum of law can provide persuasive evidence.
30
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particular non-routine transaction fits within the parameters of an opinion or 
memorandum of law that makes assumptions about a transaction, we do not believe 
that counsel must in all cases “match” the transaction to the opinion or memorandum. 
Instead, in many cases, the auditor may be able to determine that the memorandum 
encompasses the transactions, while in others the auditor may need assistance either 
from management or a lawyer (including a lawyer that is not an expert in bankruptcy 
matters) in making that determination. If the auditor, on the basis of this diligence, 
cannot determine that the transaction fits within the advice given in the memorandum, 
then in appropriate circumstances, additional evidence would be sought.
G. Auditors Should be Entitled to Review, but not Rely on, a 
Lawyer’s Conclusions
Paragraph 1.15 of the Proposal states that “an auditor should not use as evidence a 
legal opinion that... restricts use of the findings expressed therein ....” (Emphasis 
added.) The Association agrees that language in the legal conclusion flatly 
prohibiting the use of the conclusion by the auditor may not be acceptable. In this 
regard, we believe that it should be sufficient for counsel to acknowledge that its client 
may show a copy of the legal conclusion to its auditors for the purpose of the auditors’ 
evaluation of the firm’s assertions in its financial statements. Counsel should not, 
however, be required to allow the auditors to “rely” on the conclusion.31
Language such as that found in Paragraph 7 of the American Bar Association 
Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers’ Responses to Auditors’ Requests for 
Information (December 1975) is an example of an approach that the 
Association believes should be acceptable. That Paragraph, which is often 
incorporated by reference in counsel’s responses to auditors’ requests for 
information pursuant to SFAS 5, provides as follows:
“Limitation on Use of Response. Unless otherwise stated in the lawyer’s 
response, it shall be solely for the auditor’s information in connection with his 
audit of the financial condition of the client and is not to be quoted in whole or 
in part or otherwise referred to in any financial statements of the client or 
related documents, nor is it to be filed with any governmental agency or other 
person, without the lawyer’s prior written consent. Notwithstanding such 
limitation, the response can properly be furnished to others in compliance with 
court process or when necessary in order to defend the auditor against a 
challenge of the audit by the client or a regulatory agency, provided that the 
lawyer is given written notice of the circumstances at least twenty days before 
the response is so to be furnished to others, or as long in advance as possible if
(continued...)
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For the foregoing reasons, the Association strongly urges the AITF to hold the 
Proposal in abeyance until it can be considered by the FASB and be the subject of 
the normal due process of the FASB, including an opportunity for public comment.
III. CONCLUSION
We would be happy to discuss our views at your convenience. Please contact either of 
the undersigned at (212) 440-9400 or our special counsel in this matter, Seth 
Grosshandler of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, at (212) 225-2542 with any 
questions or comments.
Sincerely,
Paul Saltzman
Senior Vice President and General 
Counsel
Patricia E. Brigantic
Vice President and Assistant General 
Counsel
cc: Michael Sutton, Chief Accountant,
Securities and Exchange Commission
Richard R. Lindsey, Director, Division of Market Regulation 
Securities and Exchange Commission
Robert L. Colby, Deputy Director, Division of Market Regulation,
Securities and Exchange Commission
Michael A. Macchiaroli, Associate Director, Division of Market Regulation, 
Securities and Exchange Commission
Thomas Bolt, Esq. Counsel,
(...continued)
the situation does not permit such period of notice.”
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Roger Anderson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal Finance
U.S. Department of the Treasury
Mark Tenhundfeld, Assistant Director of Legislative and Regulatory Activities 
Office of the Comptroller of Currency
Thomas M. Corsi, Senior Attorney, Legal Division 
Federal Reserve Bank
Christine Harrington, Counsel, Regulations and Legislation Division 
Office of Thrift Supervision
Shiela Albin, Associate General Counsel for Operations 
National Credit Union Administration
Members of the Board of Directors, The Bond Market Association
Members of the Accounting Policy Committee, The Bond Market Association 
Selected Staff of The Bond Market Association
Bankers Trust Company
One Bankers Trust Plaza, New York, New York 10006
Mark S. Leiman
Managing Director
Tel: 212-250-9241
Fax: 212-250-1641 December 15, 1997
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2605
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re; November 24, 1997 Draft Proposal of AU Section 9336
Dear Ms. Dilley:
Bankers Trust New York Corporation appreciates the opportunity to comment on the November 
24, 1997 Draft of the Audit Issues Task Force (“AITF”) of Proposed AU Section 9336 (the 
“Proposal”), relating to the use of legal interpretations as evidential matter to support 
management’s assertion that a transfer of financial assets qualifies as a sale under Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 125 (“SFAS 125”) of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (the “FASB”).
Bankers Trust New York Corporation is a bank holding company that, as of September 30, 1997, 
had consolidated total assets of $140.1 billion. Its principal banking subsidiary, Bankers Trust 
Company, is among the largest commercial banks in New York City and the United States, based 
on consolidated total assets. Among its other subsidiaries is BT Alex. Brown Incorporated, an 
SEC-registered broker-dealer that is a leading provider of financing to fast-growing companies.
General
We believe that the Proposal establishes an unreasonably high evidential standard that is not 
required by SFAS 125 itself or by current practices in related areas. We believe that such a 
standard would lead to inaccurate and inconsistent accounting treatment of transactions and 
would result in the incurrence of excessive costs of compliance. We believe that the “reasonable 
assurances” evidential standard for “isolation” required by SFAS 125 should be permitted to be 
met through the receipt of legal advice in forms other than legal opinions of the type required by 
the Proposal and that such a standard would enable accounting treatment to more accurately 
reflect economic and legal realities, promote consistency and symmetry and prevent excessive 
costs from being incurred.
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SFAS 125 and the Proposal
Paragraph 9 of SFAS 125 permits a transfer of financial assets to be accounted for as a sale only 
when the transferor has “surrendered control” thereof Paragraph 9(a) establishes as one of the 
conditions to evidence surrender of control that “[t]he transferred assets have been isolated from 
the transferor -- put presumptively beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in 
bankruptcy or other receivership”. Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125 describes the accountants’ task as 
“making judgments [about] whether a transfer of financial assets would likely be deemed a true 
sale at law” and establishes as the evidential standard for “isolation” whether available evidence 
“provides reasonable assurance that the transferred assets would be beyond the reach of the 
powers of a bankruptcy trustee or other receiver for the transferor or any of its affiliates” 
(emphasis added).
SFAS 125 itself does not require, and the FASB has not interpreted SFAS 125 to require, that 
this “reasonable assurance” come in the form of an unqualified legal opinion. In Paragraphs 82 
and 101 of the Exposure Draft of October 24, 1995 of SFAS 125, the FASB expressly did not 
require any legal opinions whatsoever. While the final version of SFAS 125 did not contain 
these express disclaimers, neither SFAS 125 nor the FASB stated that a legal opinion would be 
required. In fact, Paragraph 119 of SFAS 125, which was derived from Paragraph 101 of the 
Exposure Draft, in addressing concerns about the feasibility of basing an accounting standard on 
legal considerations, continues to state that “having to consider only the evidence available 
should make that requirement workable”.
The Proposal, by contrast, essentially requires that, with respect to all transfers of financial assets 
other than “routine” transfers that “do[] not result in any continuing involvement by the 
transferor”, a legal opinion be obtained to the effect that (i) the transferred financial assets would 
not be deemed to be property of the transferor’s estate for purposes of applicable insolvency law 
and (ii) a court would not grant an order consolidating the assets and liabilities of the transferee 
with those of the transferor in a case involving the insolvency of the transferor.
We believe that such legal opinion requirement sets a standard far in excess of that necessary to 
obtain the “reasonable assurance” of isolation required by SFAS 125, and that such “reasonable 
assurance” standard should be permitted to be met through the receipt of legal advice in forms 
other than legal opinions of the type required by the Proposal.
As described below, lawyers’ standards for rendering legal opinions in the form required by the 
Proposal are sufficiently high, and insolvency law is sufficiently uncertain, that, even in 
situations where it is highly likely that “isolation” has been achieved, the required legal opinion 
may not be able to be rendered. In practice, the effect of the Proposal would be to cause 
transactions that, based on the preponderance of the evidence, should be characterized as sales, to 
be characterized as secured borrowings. Transferors in transactions that are not cleanly 
“opinionable” will therefore report artificially high levels of assets on their balance sheets and, in 
the case of regulated financial institutions, artificially low capital adequacy and leverage ratios.
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In addition, because opinion practice will undoubtedly vary from law firm to law firm, such a 
standard could result in inconsistent accounting treatment of a given type of transaction and, 
where two parties to a transaction are receiving legal opinions from different firms, asymmetrical 
accounting of a single transaction, resulting in the “double counting” of assets. Moreover, 
whether a legal opinion is obtained with respect to a given transaction will often depend upon 
considerations of cost and timing. In short, such a standard would encourage accounting that 
does not accurately reflect underlying economic and legal realities and that could result in 
inconsistent and asymmetric treatment of transactions.
Use of Legal Advice in Other Areas of Accounting
In other areas of accounting, even areas where there is some degree of reliance upon legal advice, 
the degree of certainty required by the Proposal with respect to the legal consequences is not 
required. For example, FIN 39 and FIN 41 (which incorporates the FIN 39 standard), regarding 
the offsetting of certain contracts, require a determination to be made as to whether a purported 
right of setoff is enforceable at law — that is, whether it would be respected in a bankruptcy of 
the counterparty. The interpretation of FIN 39 contained in EITF D-43 provides that 
“ [o]ffsetting is appropriate only if the available evidence, both positive and negative, indicates 
that there is a reasonable assurance that the right of setoff would be upheld in bankruptcy” 
(emphasis added). This standard, which closely parallels the “reasonable assurance” standard of 
Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125, has not been interpreted to require evidential matter in the form of 
“would” legal opinions. In fact, EITF D-43 itself recognizes that “[t]he nature of support 
required for an assertion in financial statements that a right of setoff is enforceable at law is 
subject to a cost-benefit constraint and depends on facts and circumstances.”
Determination of legal title to assets is another area in which the work of a legal specialist is 
relied upon to determine accounting treatment. Accounting practice has not required that legal 
advice with respect to title matters, when obtained, come in the form of an unqualified legal 
opinion.
Legal Opinions
Lawyers require an extremely high degree of certainty to be able to render a legal opinion that is 
not “reasoned” or otherwise qualified in a manner that would conflict with the Proposal. 
Rendering “clean” opinions in an insolvency context is especially problematic because there is 
often no statute or other dispositive legal rule that governs whether property would or would not 
be included in the insolvency estate of a debtor. Generally, it is necessary for lawyers to rely 
upon case law which was decided by courts other than final courts of appeal (and are therefore 
not necessarily dispositive) or in factual situations that are not identical to the factual situation 
with respect to which counsel is opining. Because of this, it is often not possible to achieve 
certainty either as to what the law is in a particular context or whether the law would be applied 
in a particular way in a given factual context. Therefore, legal opinions in this area are often 
“reasoned” opinions where the lawyer takes what he or she believes to be the salient facts in
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relation to the matter being opined upon and applies what legal precedent he or she believes is 
relevant to the analysis, to reach a conclusion about what a court might do in a particular 
situation.
The difficulty of obtaining legal opinions is compounded in the case of multi-jurisdictional 
transactions or transactions in a single jurisdiction involving different insolvency regimes (for 
instance, in the U.S., corporations are generally subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, while 
insured depository institutions are subject to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and insurance 
companies are subject to state law). Many jurisdictions may not have developed or precise rules 
in this area. In addition, there may be more than one legal system whose substantive laws would 
be relevant to a particular transaction, and the jurisdiction of organization of a party will not 
always be determinative. For example, a foreign company with U.S. assets could be subject to a 
bankruptcy proceeding in U.S. courts under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, as well as being subject 
to the insolvency law of its home jurisdiction in proceedings in the courts of such jurisdiction.
The difficulties in obtaining legal opinions on a single legal point with respect to multiple 
jurisdictions is well illustrated by the efforts of the International Swap and Derivatives 
Association, Inc. (the “ISDA”) in the area of swap netting. Over the course of the last several 
years, the ISDA has been soliciting opinions from law firms in nations around the world as to the 
enforceability of the netting provisions in the ISDA’s standard-form master swap agreement. 
Despite several years of effort, opinions have still not be obtained with respect to all significant 
jurisdictions or all insolvency regimes in the jurisdictions for which opinions have been obtained. 
Thus, even where legal opinions with respect to a standard-form document are being relied upon 
with respect to a class of transactions, the process of obtaining such opinions in multiple 
jurisdictions would take a great deal of time and effort to implement.
It appears that the legal opinion standard contained in the Proposal has been taken from the rated 
asset-backed securities context and extended to cover all financial assets. The nature of asset- 
backed securities transactions and the reasons such opinions are rendered in connection with 
them, however, make such extension inappropriate. Unlike many other financial assets for which 
the Proposal would require an opinion, rated asset-backed securities transactions typically (i) are 
complex, (ii) contain unique features, (iii) require “continuing involvement” by the transferor in 
several capacities, (iv) involve large dollar values (frequently in excess of $100,000,000) and are 
exceptional transactions for the parties and (v) require extensive use of outside counsel. The 
practice of receiving “true sale” and “non-consolidation” legal opinions in such transactions 
arose from the rating agencies’ requirement that the effectiveness of the transfer -- and the 
inability of third parties to disrupt the transferee’s activities, even temporarily — be demonstrated 
to a virtual certainty, a standard that is in excess of the “reasonable assurance” required by SFAS 
125. It should be noted that not all rating agencies require unqualified legal opinions of the type 
required by the Proposal.
In contrast with asset-backed securities, for many of the financial assets covered by SFAS 125, 
such as repurchase agreements, securities loans, swaps and loan participations, there is no
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tradition of attorneys rendering legal opinions with respect to insolvency issues or with respect to 
any other aspect of the transaction. In most cases, no attorneys are involved whatsoever. 
Additionally, such transactions are often done repeatedly, pursuant to standard-form documents. 
Obtaining written legal opinions at all in such transactions would be extremely costly, time- 
consuming and burdensome.
Auditors’ Use of Legal Advice
Another issue addressed by the Proposal is whether limitations on use contained in legal advice 
would render such advice unacceptable as evidential matter. Paragraph 1.15 of the Proposal 
states that legal opinions containing provisions restricting their use to the law firm's client or to 
third parties other than the auditor are unacceptable as audit evidence. Such statements are 
universal features of legal opinions and are designed limit the number of parties who, in the 
event the opinion proved to be incorrect, may be entitled to assert claims against the rendering 
law firm. We believe that it should be sufficient for a legal specialist to acknowledge that the 
legal specialist’s client (the company being audited) may show a copy of the legal opinion (or 
other form of legal advice) to its auditors for the purpose of the auditors’ evaluation of the firm’s 
assertions in its financial statements. We do not believe, however, that the legal specialist should 
be required to allow the auditors to “rely” on the legal advice.
Conclusion
We believe that legal advice in forms other than a “would” legal opinion should be deemed to be 
acceptable evidential matter to provide “reasonable assurance” that the isolation standard of 
SFAS 125 has been met. Such legal advice should be permitted to take the form of not only 
legal opinions not meeting the technical standards of the Proposal, but also memoranda of law 
and oral legal advice. What should be determinative is that the legal advice conclude that it is 
probable or more likely than not that the isolation standard has been met.
Many transactions that “result in [] continuing involvement by the transferor” are nonetheless 
“routine” in the sense that transactions involving the same fact pattern relevant to the “isolation” 
standard have been engaged in repeatedly in the past. In such cases, prior legal advice, whether 
in the form of a legal opinion, a memorandum of law or oral legal advice, should be permitted to 
be relied upon. In those areas where recognized industry groups have solicited legal advice with 
respect to classes of transactions (for instance, transactions governed by the group’s standard- 
form documents), such legal advice should be permitted to be relied upon for factually similar 
transactions. In addition, assuming such legal advice clearly identified the factual elements 
underlying the advice, a non-lawyer should be able to evaluate whether a new transaction 
possessed factual elements matching those for which the advice was given, since the existence of 
such elements is primarily a factual, and not a legal, question.
We believe that the foregoing practices are consistent with the “reasonable assurance” standard 
of SFAS 125 and would lead to increased accuracy and consistency in accounting in a cost-
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effective manner. Such practices would not permit transactions that are more appropriately 
characterized as secured borrowings to be characterized as sales. Rather, such practices would 
help eliminate situations in which the characterization of a transaction depended not upon 
economic and legal realities but upon whether the technical requirements of an artificially high 
evidential standard could be met. While simplifying the auditors' task by establishing a “bright- 
line” standard may be an understandable objective in some circumstances, we believe that 
inaccuracy and inconsistency are too high a price to pay for such simplification.
* **
Should you have any questions or comments regarding this letter, please feel free to contact me 
at (212) 250-9241, or Joseph C. Kopec, Esq., Vice President & Counsel, at (212) 250-4925.
Sincerely,
Mark S. Leiman 
Managing Director
cc: Richard H. Daniel
Mary M. Marr 
Melvin A. Yellin, Esq. 
Lanny A. Schwartz, Esq. 
Salvatore P. Palazzolo, Esq. 
Joseph C. Kopec. Esq.
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MBNA
Thomas D. Wren
Senior Executive Vice President 
Treasurer
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Wilmington, Delaware 19884-0783
December 15, 1997
Julie Anne Dilley
Technical Manager, Audit and Attest Standards
File 2605
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
RE: Proposed Auditing Interpretation under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
Number 125, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 
Extinguishments of Liabilities
Dear Ms. Dilley:
MBNA America Bank, N.A. (“MBNA”), a national bank and the principal subsidiary of 
MBNA Corporation, appreciates the opportunity to comment on the November 24, 1997 
Draft of the AU Section 9336 (“the Proposal”) which was proposed by the Audit Issues 
Task Force (“AITF”) of the Auditing Standards Board. MBNA is a major bank credit 
card lender and has total assets of approximately $18.5 billion and total managed loans of 
$45.7 billion as of September 30, 1997.
The Proposal is intended to provide guidance concerning the use and sufficiency of legal 
advice as audit evidence to support an assertion that a transfer of financial assets meets 
the isolation criterion of Paragraph 9(a) of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
Number 125, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 
Extinguishments of Liabilities (“SFAS No. 125”). In addition, the Proposal provides 
guidance as to the wording of legal opinions that would support sale treatment.
The letter which accompanied the Proposal states that the AITF has initiated discussions 
with the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB”) and representatives of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) regarding guidance contained in 
Paragraphs 58 and 121 of SFAS No. 125. These paragraphs address securitization 
structures utilized by banks subject to FDIC receivership, as well as securitization 
structures for other companies not subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The letter states
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that guidance based on these discussions will be included in the final Interpretation, 
implying that there will be no comment period for the guidance which relates to entities 
not subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code but which are subject to FDIC receivership.
MBNA appreciates the AITF’s effort to standardize and more clearly define the audit 
evidence required to support sale treatment of an asset securitization. In addition, MBNA 
recognizes that AITF Interpretations are not customarily released for public comment. 
However, MBNA strongly believes that, because guidance for entities subject to the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code was released for public comment, guidance addressing banks subject to 
FDIC receivership should receive similar treatment prior to being included in a final 
Interpretation. Banks subject to FDIC receivership are major participants in the asset 
backed securities market and should be permitted to comment on any proposal which 
would impact the accounting for such a significant aspect of the banking industry’s 
operations.
Regarding the Proposal, MBNA has the following comments.
First, paragraph 23 of SFAS No. 125 requires "reasonable assurance” that transferred 
assets are beyond the reach of the transferor’s creditors, even in the event of bankruptcy 
or insolvency of the transferor. MBNA believes that a legal opinion stating that a transfer 
of assets would either be treated as a sale or as a perfected security interest provides 
reasonable assurance that the assets arc beyond the reach of the transferor, even in 
bankruptcy or insolvency (an “either/or” opinion). MBNA believes that the AITF’s 
proposed requirement of a “would” opinion exceeds the reasonable assurance standard of 
SFAS No. 125.
Second, the requirement for a legal opinion for asset securitization transactions conflicts 
with other current accounting and auditing guidance, such as Financial Accounting 
Standards Board Interpretation Number 39, Offsetting of Amounts Related to Certain 
Contracts (FIN 39). FIN 39 does not specifically require a particular level or type of 
audit evidence to support the implied legal assertion; rather it leaves the question of 
sufficiency of audit evidence to the auditor’s judgment, which is a less restrictive 
approach than the proposed AITF Interpretation. Therefore, this Proposal would create 
inconsistency within current accounting and auditing literature.
Third, a specific wording requirement for a bankruptcy legal opinion could impact the 
ability of multinational entities to securitize outside the U.S. market. Specifically, the 
Proposal’s suggested wording may not be consistent with legal opinions in foreign 
countries due to differences in bankruptcy law and therefore could limit the ability of 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations to securitize loans and other financial assets.
Fourth, we wanted to comment on the last sentence of Paragraph 1.15 of the Proposal, 
particularly the wording “use the opinion”. Paragraph 1.15 indicates that legal opinions
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that restrict the use of such opinions by the auditors are not acceptable audit evidence. 
The Proposal suggests, however, that a restricted opinion would be sufficient if the client 
receives the legal specialist’s written permission for the auditor to use the opioion 
(emphasis added). We believe that is it unclear whether the word “use” should be 
construed to mean review (i.e., review the opinion) or to mean rely on (i.e., rely on the 
opinion). Accordingly, we recommend that Paragraph 1.15 be revised to state, “for the 
auditor to review the opinion” as we believe that the auditor’s review of the restricted 
opinion should be sufficient evidence to gain reasonable assurance of isolation.
Finally, MBNA believes that the implementation date of January 1, 1998 does not allow 
enough time for issuers to address the more stringent requirements included in the 
proposal. For example, an issuer who is planning to securitize financial assets in January 
1998 will have little time to evaluate the impact of the Proposal on the transaction and to 
make any required changes.
MBNA strongly urges the AITF to reconsider releasing guidance related to the outcome 
of the AITF’s discussions with the FASB and the FDIC for comment by entities subject 
to FDIC receivership. In addition, we urge you to consider the comments above in your 
draft. If you have any questions on any of these items, please contact me or Victor P. 
Manning, Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer at (302) 453- 
6707.
Sincerely,
Thomas D. Wren
Senior Executive Vice President and 
Treasurer
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Dear Ms. Dilley:
On behalf of our members, the American Bankers Association (ABA) appreciates 
the opportunity to submit comments on the working draft of a proposed auditing 
interpretation, “The Use of Legal Interpretations As Evidential Matter to Support 
Management’s Assertion that a Transfer of Financial Assets Qualifies As a Sale,” of 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 73, Using the Work of a Specialist (working draft). 
This proposed auditing interpretation of the AICPA’s Audit Issues Task Force (AITF) of 
the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) was available for comment on November 24, 1997 
with responses due by December 15, 1997. The American Bankers Association brings 
together all categories of banking institutions to best represent the interests of the rapidly 
changing industry. Its membership - which includes community, regional and money 
center banks and holding companies, as well as savings associations, trust companies and 
savings banks - makes ABA the largest banking trade association in the country.
We are concerned that elements of the working draft misinterpret paragraph 9(a) 
of FASB Statement No. 125: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets 
and Extinguishments of Liabilities (SFAS 125). The threshold for evidence to support the 
assertion that transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor and its creditors in 
the working draft is much higher than stated in SFAS 125 and is also much higher than is 
currently demanded by participants in the marketplace for certain transfers of assets. For 
example, the proposed threshold for evidence to support sale treatment in the working 
draft would go beyond what is currently provided for asset sales, such as loan 
participations, and asset securitizations by entities subject to receivership laws other than 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. We believe that unless changes and clarifications are made,
the working draft has the potential to significantly increase legal costs and to eliminate 
sale accounting treatment for transactions that fully meet the requirements of SFAS 125.
Paragraph 9(a) is one of four criteria that must be met in order to account for a 
transfer of assets as a sale under SFAS 125. Paragraph 9(a) requires that a transferor 
demonstrate that transferred assets are isolated from the transferor. The required level of 
evidence is that the transferor show that transferred assets are “presumptively beyond the 
reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other receivership” 
(emphasis added). Further guidance on the type of evidence required to apply paragraph 
9(a) is contained in paragraph 23 of SFAS 125. Paragraph 23 states that all available 
evidence be considered and that the available evidence needs to provide “reasonable 
assurance” that the transferred assets would be beyond the reach of a bankruptcy trustee 
or other receiver for the transferor (emphasis added).
The FASB developed this threshold for evidence to address the concerns raised by 
constituents during the deliberations on SFAS 125 about the feasibility of a sale criterion 
strictly based on legal considerations. Paragraph 119 of the basis for conclusions in 
SFAS 125 states that “the Board concluded that having to consider only the evidence 
available should make that requirement workable” (emphasis added). However, the 
following paragraphs describe elements of the working draft that are at odds with SFAS 
125 and would unreasonably raise the level of evidence needed to substantiate sale 
treatment.
• Paragraph .12:
The example of “persuasive evidence” to support management’s assertion that 
transferred assets are beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors goes beyond 
what is currently being provided by attorneys. It is our understanding that it may be 
difficult for attorneys to opine, as proposed, that certain types of transactions “would be 
considered to be a sale.. .and not a loan” (emphasis added) and that “a court would not 
grant an order consolidating the assets and liabilities of the Purchaser with those of the 
Seller in a case involving insolvency of the Seller” (emphasis added). Attorneys use 
alternative phrasing that, in the context of the overall legal analysis, provides reasonable 
assurance that the transferred assets have been sufficiently isolated. It is not clear why 
auditors need to require a higher level of evidence than is required by SFAS 125 and the 
marketplace.
• Paragraph .13:
The examples in the working draft of “inadequate opinions” that do not provide 
“persuasive evidence” also go beyond what is currently being provided by attorneys on 
asset transfers by entities that are not subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. First, the
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examples imply that anything less than a “would” opinion would not suffice as adequate 
evidence. As stated in our comments on paragraph .12, it is our understanding that it may 
be difficult for attorneys to provide this opinion. Second, footnote 5 could render 
opinions used by entities that are not subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code inadequate. 
Footnote 5 states that, under limited circumstances, the following opinion would be 
adequate: “In our opinion, the transfer would either be a sale or...” We recommend that 
the AITF clarify under what circumstances this opinion would be acceptable and then 
issue the guidance for public comment. Third, the working draft would prohibit entities 
from using memorandum of law opinions for multiple transactions that are similar in 
nature. The evidence required by paragraph .13 unjustifiably goes beyond SFAS 125.
• Paragraph .15:
The proposed restriction on the usage of legal opinions by auditors in the working 
draft is a narrow interpretation of SFAS 125 that would unnecessarily raise legal costs. 
The working draft proposes that auditors should request the legal specialist’s written 
permission to use legal opinions, rather than relying on the legal opinions that are 
provided to entities transferring assets or to third parties other than auditors. We believe 
that reviewing the opinions of the legal specialists should be sufficient to help auditors 
evaluate whether transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor.
• Paragraph .17:
The guidance in the working draft goes beyond the requirements of SFAS 125 by 
stating that a legal opinion is the only form of persuasive evidence of a transfer of assets. 
There are other forms of evidence, such as policy statements from federal agencies, that 
should also be considered in determining whether transferred assets have been isolated 
beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors.
• Paragraph .18:
The AITF has proposed an overly ambitious timetable to implement the guidance 
in this working draft. First, if implemented as proposed, the working draft would require 
attorneys to make significant changes to legal opinions. The marketplace needs time to 
evaluate the changes in the working draft and incorporate the changes into asset transfer 
transactions. Second, the AITF needs to clarify the language in the working draft 
regarding what types of legal opinions would be acceptable for transferors that are not 
subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. For these reasons, it would be prudent for the AITF 
to delay the effective date one year and apply the guidance to transactions that occur after 
January 1, 1999.
3
* * * * *
We are concerned that the result of the proposed interpretation will be to require a 
significantly higher threshold be met in order for certain transfers to recognized as sales, 
effectively amending SFAS 125. We encourage the AITF not to issue the proposal in its 
current form without providing additional opportunity for discussions with industry. We 
would be glad to work with you as you proceed to finalize the auditing guidance.
Paul V. Salfi  
Senior Financial Policy Analyst
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Managing Director and 
Controller
Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Company of 
New York
60 Wall Street 
New York NY 
10260-0060
Tel: 212 648-9095
December 15, 1997
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: File 2605, The Use of Legal Interpretations As Evidential Matter to Support 
Management’s Assertion that a Transfer of Financial Assets Qualifies As a 
Sale.
Dear Ms. Dilley:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the above-mentioned proposal. 
While we understand the AITF’s desire to provide guidance to auditors 
regarding the evidence required to attain “reasonable assurance,” we are greatly 
concerned about the requirements that this interpretation would impose on 
financial statement preparers, and believe that it will have a negative impact on 
our ability and our clients’ ability to effect transactions. In addition, we believe 
that if a “would” level of legal opinion is required for SFAS 125 transactions, the 
balance sheets of many companies will not reflect true economic reality, but 
rather will reflect positions that are the result of remote legal uncertainty.
In particular, we believe that the proposed auditing interpretation imposes a 
requirement for a level of legal assurance that:
• is overly restrictive in its requirements for “would” level opinions;
• is inconsistent with, and goes well beyond, the established interpretation of 
“reasonable assurance”;
• is in direct contradiction with the FASB’s previous decision to drop the 
requirement for a legal opinion from the final version of SFAS 125, and is 
inconsistent with the stated intent of SFAS 125;
• does not take into account available evidence other than legal opinions; and
• will impose burdensome costs on financial statement preparers.
Accordingly, we ask that you seriously reconsider this proposal.
Each of the above points is discussed in more detail below.
A subsidiary of 
J.P. Morgan & Co. 
Incorporated
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“Would” opinions often cannot be rendered by law firms due to lack of 
relevant case law and/or differing standards among firms 
Law firms are often unable to render a “would” level opinion for a sale 
transaction, due to differing standards among law firms regarding the 
requirements for a “would” level opinion, conflicting authority in different 
jurisdictions, or lack of authority and precedent. The situation can be especially 
acute in foreign jurisdictions, where the law on matters such as securitization 
may be even less well developed than US law.
It should be noted that the distinction between “should” and “would” Opinions is 
very unclear. As noted in the Special Report by the Tribar Opinion Committee: 
Opinions in the Bankruptcy Context: Rating Agency, Structured Financing and 
Chapter 11 Transactions)
Many lawyers are uncomfortable with this distinction [between should and would] 
because they believe that a lawyer can only opine as to what a court should do when 
applying the applicable law to the relevant facts. Accordingly, some lawyers, when 
required to give a “would” opinion, have stated in the opinion letter that, in giving 
such an opinion, they are doing so on the understanding that the opinions expressed 
are not a prediction as to what a court would actually hold but an opinion as to the 
decision a court would reach if the issue were properly presented to it and the court 
followed existing legal precedents applicable to the subject matter of the opinion.
The [Tribar] Committee has found no case law or published secondary authority 
for the proposition that a stronger opinion is being expressed by the use of the 
word “would,” in the context of a legal opinion, as opposed to the word “should.” 
(emphasis added)
We suggest that the AITF be less formulaic in terms of the legal opinion 
requirements and instead allow judgment to be rendered by management, with 
advice of legal counsel (internal and external) and the auditors, in order to 
accommodate situations in which a particular legal opinion standard can not be 
met. If a “would” opinion requirement is imposed for SFAS 125 transactions, 
the balance sheets of many companies will not reflect true economic reality, but 
rather will reflect positions that are the result of remote legal uncertainty.
If the AITF decides to adopt a set standard for legal opinions, we would 
encourage the AITF to accept the following types of opinions as satisfying the
1 46 Bus. Law. 717 (February 1991)
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“reasonable assurance” standard:
 “We are of the view that a court would...”
“There is a reasonable basis to conclude that...”
  “In our opinion, the transfer should be considered a sale...”
 “In our opinion, the transfer would likely be...”
In addition, the assumptions and qualifiers to any particular opinion should be 
analyzed by parties familiar with the transaction at the time such opinion is 
rendered. No specific set of qualifiers should be mandated as acceptable or 
unacceptable, but such review should be made in accordance with the facts and 
circumstances of any particular transaction. Opinions rendered from non-U. S. 
jurisdictions should be considered under the legal opinion practices in the 
applicable jurisdiction.
Legal opinions not required for FIN 39; new requirement goes well beyond 
“reasonable assurance”
We further bring to your attention the fact that if a “would” standard is adopted 
for legal opinions, this would be inconsistent with the approach taken with 
respect to the concept of “reasonable assurance” under EITF D-43 as the 
standard required for the netting of assets and liabilities pursuant to FIN 39.
EITF D-43 states that “Offsetting is appropriate only if the available evidence, 
both positive and negative, indicated that there is reasonable assurance that the 
right of setoff would be upheld in bankruptcy.” Formal legal opinions written by 
outside legal counsel (whether “would” or “should” opinions) have not been 
necessarily required by auditors to meet the FIN 39 standard; instead, 
memoranda from internal legal counsel or other legal diligence have been 
accepted by auditors as sufficient evidence to meet the FIN 39 standard. We 
believe that there are substantial similarities between FIN 39 and SFAS 125, in 
that both standards look to the legal treatment of the transaction as a 
fundamental basis for the accounting treatment. As a result, we believe that 
there is a strong argument for applying the standard of reasonable assurance to 
SFAS 125 transactions in the same way as it is currently applied to FIN 39 
transactions.
Requirement for true sale opinion dropped from SFAS 125
We further note that the requirement to obtain “would” level legal assurance 
represents a notable departure from the FASB’s previous decision to drop such a 
requirement from the draft of the standard. While the Exposure Draft of the 
standard contained the requirement that the transaction be deemed a “true sale at 
law,” the Board agreed to substitute this specialized legal phrase with the
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economic concept of being “beyond the reach of the transferor or its creditors”; 
and although it included language stating that positive assurance is required in 
determining that assets are “beyond the reach of the transferor,” we believe that 
the Board made it clear during its deliberations that it would not require legal 
opinions for transferors to be able to make that assertion. In particular, 
paragraph 19 of SFAS 125 states that “Because legal isolation of transferred 
assets has substance, the Board decided that it could and should serve as an 
important part of the basis for determining whether a sale should be recognized. 
Some constituents expressed concern about the feasibility of an accounting 
standard based on those legal considerations, but the Board concluded that 
having to consider only the evidence available should make that requirement 
workable.’’(emphasis added) This is consistent with the decision in EITF D-43, 
which expressly recognized that “the nature of support required for an assertion 
in financial statements that a right of setoff is enforceable at law is subject to a 
cost-benefit constraint and depends on facts and circumstances.”
Requirement to obtain a legal opinion imposes an undue economic burden
The decision to reintroduce the requirement for a legal opinion also imposes 
costly requirements on financial statement preparers. Where legal opinions are 
typically already required, such as in rated securitization transactions, obtaining 
an opinion from legal counsel would not be a problem; but for other transactions, 
where opinions are not typically required (and there are many such cases), the 
requirement imposes an undue economic burden on financial statement 
preparers. It should be possible for management and auditors to use their 
judgment on the need to obtain a written legal opinion, particularly in situations 
in which oral assurance can be obtained that the relevant law applying to a 
particular transaction has not changed.
Other evidence exists and should be considered
We especially take issue with paragraph 17 of the proposed auditing 
interpretation, which states that “since the isolation aspect of surrender of 
control is assessed primarily from a legal perspective, the auditor usually will not 
be able to obtain persuasive evidence in a form other than a legal opinion.” We 
do not believe that a legal opinion is the only evidence that should be considered 
when reaching a conclusion whether a surrender of control over transferred 
assets has been achieved. Other factors to consider are (a) pronouncements and 
advice by regulators as to the likely treatment of transactions in the event of 
bankruptcy or insolvency (such as letters published and discussions with SIPC or 
the FDIC); (b) market practice and long-standing views in the marketplace that
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particular transactions are viewed as sales; and (c) the remoteness of the 
occurrence of a particular event (such as consolidation of a broker-dealer with an 
affiliate upon bankruptcy, even though there may not be enough developed law 
to support a legal opinion).
♦
Finally, given the potential impact of guidance in this area, we also request and 
strongly encourage the AITF to expose for comment the forthcoming guidance 
relating to banks subject to FDIC receivership. We believe that the exposure of 
draft standards for comment is a critical element of due process in the standard­
setting process, and encourage the AITF to continue to adhere to this procedure.
I would be pleased to discuss the above comments with you further at your 
convenience.
Sincerely,
David Sidwell
cc: Mr. Edmund Jenkins, Chairman, Financial Accounting Standards Board
FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES 
INSTITUTE
Susan M. Koski-Grafer
Vice-President - Professional Development 
and Technical Activities
December 15, 1997
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2605
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Subject: Proposed Auditing Interpretation: The Use of Legal Interpretations As
Evidential Matter to Support Management's Assertion that a Transfer of 
Financial Assets Qualifies As a Sale
Dear Ms. Dilley:
The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of the Financial Executives Institute is 
pleased to comment on the AICPA’s Proposed Auditing Interpretation, The Use of Legal 
Interpretations As Evidential Matter to Support Management ’s Assertion that a Transfer 
of Financial Assets Qualifies As a Sale. The Financial Executives Institute is an 
organization of senior corporate financial executives. Its more than 14,000 members are 
the chief financial officers, vice presidents of finance, controllers and treasurers of over 
8,000 U.S. and Canadian organizations reflecting the diversity of the business landscape, 
including nearly all of the 1,000 largest corporations in North America as well as a broad 
spectrum of smaller and privately held companies.
While CCR obviously does not object to the AICPA issuing audit guidance, we are very 
concerned that in this instance the proposed audit guidance would have the effect of 
changing the accounting requirements of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 125 (“FAS 125”) without due process.
Specifically, we believe that the auditing interpretation would have the effect of 
modifying the accounting standard contained in FAS 125 by (i) requiring that formal 
legal opinions be obtained for a significant number of transactions and (ii) requiring a 
standard higher than “reasonable assurance” that the transferred assets have been isolated 
from the transferor. In either case, a transaction which fully met the sale accounting
10 Madison Avenue, P.O. Box 1938, Morristown, New Jersey 07962-1938 (973) 898-4607 FAX (973) 898-1207 
e-mail: skoski-grafer@fei.org
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criteria in FAS 125 but did not meet the guidance in the proposed audit interpretation 
criteria would lead to one of two undesirable outcomes — a qualified or adverse audit 
opinion if the transaction was accounted for as a sale, or potentially misleading financial 
statements if it was accounted for as a financing. CCR believes that certain provisions of 
the proposed interpretation must be revised in order to avoid such adverse consequences. 
The balance of this letter describes the basis for CCR’s views along with our 
recommendations for revising the draft interpretation.
Background
One of the criteria for recognizing a transfer of financial assets as a sale under FAS 125, 
which became effective on January 1, 1997, is that “the transferred assets have been 
isolated from the transferor - put presumptively beyond the reach of the transferor and its 
creditors, even in bankruptcy or other receivership.”
CCR and many other parties objected to this approach when they responded to the 
FASB’s exposure draft which led to the issuance of FAS 125. CCR’s comment letter to 
the FASB stated:
“We do not believe that the “bankruptcy” test is necessary or appropriate. There is no 
similar test for other significant types of assets transfers (such as sales of inventory, 
fixed assets, real estate or business divestitures). Further, a bankruptcy test runs 
counter to the going-concern assumption in accounting, and could result in a company 
reporting an asset on its balance sheet over which it lacks legal/economic ownership 
and control, and reporting a liability that it does not owe and will not repay. 
Exceptions to the going concern assumption have implications far beyond asset 
transfers, and are already covered by existing accounting and reporting guidelines.”
“As the Exposure Draft itself notes, constituents (including representatives of the 
legal profession) have expressed misgivings about relying on current legal concepts 
of bankruptcy in this area. In addition, from a cost/benefit perspective, the rating 
agencies, investors, and providers of credit enhancement generally appear satisfied 
that the “bankruptcy” opinions suggested in the FASB proposal [for example, true 
sale at law opinions] are not necessary and do not add value to their assessment of 
these transactions.”
Despite the concerns raised in the comment letters, FAS 125 retained the bankruptcy 
requirement. However, paragraph 23 of FAS 125 indicates that the nature and extent of 
supporting evidence required for an assertion in the financial statements that the 
transferred financial assets have been isolated beyond the reach of the transferor and its 
creditors, even in bankruptcy or other receivership, depends on the facts and 
circumstances. All available evidence that either supports or questions an assertion must 
be considered. Sale accounting treatment is appropriate “only if the available evidence
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provides reasonable assurance that the transferred assets would be beyond the reach of the 
powers of a bankruptcy trustee or other receiver [emphasis added].”
Proposed Audit Requirement for Legal Opinions
Paragraph 17 of the proposed auditing interpretation states that “since the isolation aspect 
of surrender of control is assessed primarily from a legal perspective, the auditor usually 
will not be able to obtain persuasive evidence in a form other than a legal opinion.” The 
result of this guidance will be to require legal opinions to be obtained for audit purposes 
which are clearly not required for business purposes or for accounting purposes under 
FAS 125.
The FASB deliberated this issue extensively before reaching their conclusion in FAS 125 
that consideration be given to all available evidence. FAS 125 does not require that legal 
opinions be obtained solely for accounting purposes. The basis for conclusions in FAS 
125 contains the following discussion of this decision [emphasis added]:
118. ...Credit rating agencies and investors in securitized assets pay close attention 
to (a) the possibility of bankruptcy or other receivership of the transferor, its 
affiliates, or the special-purpose entity, even though that possibility may seem 
unlikely given the present credit standing of the transferor, and (b) what might 
happen in such a receivership, because those are major areas of risk for 
them...Credit rating agencies and investors commonly demand transaction 
structures that minimize those possibilities and sometimes seek assurances from 
attorneys about whether entities can be forced into receivership, what the powers 
of a receiver might be, and whether the transaction structure would withstand 
receivers' attempts to reach the securitized assets in ways that would harm 
investors...
119. Because legal isolation of transferred assets has substance, the Board decided 
that it could and should serve as an important part of the basis for determining 
whether a sale should be recognized. Some constituents expressed concern about 
the feasibility of an accounting standard based on those legal considerations, but
the Board concluded that having to consider only the evidence available should
make that requirement workable.
The proposed audit guidance requiring that legal opinions be obtained solely for auditing 
purposes runs counter to the FASB’s accounting conclusion. In fact, the underlined 
comment in paragraph 119 above suggests that the FASB had previously concluded that 
the AICPA’s current proposal would be unworkable. CCR believes that the AICPA 
should avoid imposing an audit requirement that goes beyond the accounting 
requirements of FAS 125. Our specific recommendation is that the second sentence of
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paragraph 17 in the proposed audit interpretation be eliminated, in order to conform the 
audit guidance with the accounting standard.
Proposed Guidance on Persuasive Evidence
Paragraph 13 of the proposed interpretation states that “a legal letter that includes 
conclusions that are expressed using some of the following language would not provide 
persuasive evidence,” and goes on to provide a series of 11 sentence fragments that might 
appear in a legal letter. Under the proposed interpretation, the presence of any of these 
sentence fragments would cause the auditor to reject the adequacy of the letter.
CCR does not believe that the proposed guidance is appropriate, because it would cause 
the auditor to reject a legal letter containing certain phrases even if the letter in its totality 
provides the reasonable assurance required by FAS 125. In effect, the proposed 
interpretation replaces the FAS 125 requirement for reasonable assurance with an audit 
standard requiring virtual certainty.
In CCR’s view, it is essential that judgment be applied in determining whether a legal 
letter provides persuasive evidence and reasonable assurance. The legal profession itself 
emphasizes the importance of considering the overall legal analysis. For example, the 
Legal Opinion Accord of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association 
(1991) discusses an “explained opinion” as follows:
“An explained opinion (often referred to as a “reasoned opinion”) expresses not 
only a legal conclusion but also provides or summarizes the legal analysis 
supporting that conclusion. Explained opinions often deal with issues involving 
legal uncertainties due to the nature of the process (e.g., bankruptcy), conflicting 
authority or perhaps lack of authority. While an explained opinion may also reach 
a qualified or unqualified conclusion, the ultimate professional judgment cannot, 
in either case, be fairly separated from the totality of the opinion provided.”
A similar view is expressed in the Business Law Monograph, “Legal Opinions in 
Corporate Transactions” by Arthur Field and Read Ryan of Shearman & Sterling (1992). 
CCR notes that the proposed audit interpretation indicates that legal letters containing the 
word “would” provide persuasive evidence, while opinions using the word “should” do 
not. Field and Ryan make the following observation:
“Sometimes the recipient will want the word “would” used. There is no 
difference in meaning whether the word “would” or “should” is used. One judges 
the force of a reasoned opinion by the authorities cited and the reasoning in it, and 
not by labels.”
CCR believes that the auditing guidance should be consistent with the reasonable 
assurance requirement of FAS 125, and should not require virtual certainty. Sentence
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fragments should not be considered in isolation, but instead need to be evaluated in the 
context of the legal letter as a whole. CCR therefore recommends that the audit 
interpretation be revised to replace the listing of sentence fragments with an emphasis on 
the need for professional judgment in evaluating the overall legal analysis.
However, if the AICPA believes that specific examples of wording need to be provided in 
the auditing interpretation, CCR recommends that the guidance be revised to indicate that 
the following sentence fragments -- which the current draft states are problematic from an 
audit perspective — would be compatible with persuasive evidence if supported by the 
overall legal analysis:
• "We are of the view...
• "There is a reasonable basis to conclude that..."
• "In our opinion, the transfer should be considered a sale..."
• "In our opinion, the transfer would presumptively be..."
• "In our opinion, it is probable that..."
• "In our opinion, the transfer would either be a sale or a perfected security
interest..."
As noted above, CCR’s overall concerns are with the portions of the draft audit 
interpretation that would have the effect of modifying the accounting standards contained 
in FAS 125. If, after considering these concerns, the AICPA decides to proceed with the 
audit guidance as currently drafted, we believe that due process is needed comparable to 
that which would be provided if the FASB were amending FAS 125.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments further at your convenience. This 
response was developed on behalf of CCR by Fred Battline of Citicorp, a member of 
CCR’s Financial Instruments and Hedging Subcommittee. Should you have any 
questions, please contact him at (212) 559-7721.
Sincerely,
Susan M. Koski-Grafer 
VP-Professional Development & 
Technical Activities
Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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December 15, 1997
VIA FACSIMILE [(212) 596-6091] AND U.S. MAIL
Auditing Standards Board
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attention: Julie Ann Dilley
Technical Manager,
Audit and Attest Standards,
File 2605
Re: “Proposed Auditing Interpretation, The Use of Legal Interpretations as Evidential
Matter to Support Management’s Assertion that a Transfer of Financial Assets 
Qualifies As a Sale.” of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 73, Using the Work 
of a Specialist (“Proposed Interpretation”).
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:
On behalf of the Committee on Law and Accounting, with participation of the Committee 
on Business Bankruptcy and the Subcommittee on Structured Financings of the Section of 
Business Law of the American Bar Association, we are writing to comment on the above 
described proposed interpretation. All references to paragraph numbers apply to the paragraphs 
so numbered in the Proposed Interpretation.
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The comments herein have been prepared by a Task Force composed of members of the 
Committee on Law and Accounting. However, these comments do not represent the official 
position of the American Bar Association, the Section of Business Law or of the Committees or 
Subcommittee named above.
We note preliminarily that the Proposed Interpretation deals with the verification of an 
assertion by an entity in its financial statements that transferred financial assets have been put 
presumptively beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors. We also note that the 
determination of the accuracy of such assertion may be largely a matter of law. Accordingly, the 
auditor may be required in many cases to use a legal opinion as evidential matter in assessing 
the accuracy of such assertion.
1. The “persuasive evidence” standard:
The language of SFAS 125, and in particular 23, requires that “the available evidence 
provide reasonable assurance that the transferred assets would be beyond the reach of the 
powers of a bankruptcy trustee or other receiver...” [emphasis ours]. However, the 
Proposed Interpretation requires, in effect, that the opinion of the legal specialist provide 
“persuasive evidence to support management’s assertion that a transfer of financial assets 
meets the isolation criterion of SFAS 125.” 1.02, emphasis ours]
This standard of persuasive evidence is not contained in, or in our view justified by, the 
requirements of SFAS 125. Nor, to the best of our knowledge, is it required by the 
“sufficient evidential matter” field work standard of GAAS.
In our view, this is a central flaw in the Proposed Interpretation section, leading to a 
series of inappropriate conclusions, including limits on the language of an acceptable 
attorney’s opinion (¶ 1.13), limits on the use of an opinion restricted to stated third parties
1.15, 1.16), and excessive--if not exclusive--reliance on the opinion as the sole audit 
evidence (¶1.16).
2. Limits on the permissible language of the attorney’s opinion:
The draft contains a laundry list of forbidden clauses, any of which would apparently 
prevent an opinion from constituting “persuasive evidence.” Our objections to the 
“persuasive evidence” standard are indicated above. Independently, however, this list is 
in our view inappropriate.
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In the first instance, an opinion of an attorney should represent a component of the 
evidential matter collected in the audit, irrespective of its language. The language should 
go not to whether the opinion is evidential matter, but rather to its weight.
Secondly, several of the forbidden clauses in ¶ 1.13 (e.g., those speaking of 
“presumptively” “probable,” and “either or”) should, in appropriate circumstances, be an 
entirely satisfactory basis for the conclusion required by SFAS 125.
An important, and troublesome, implication of the draft (amplified by its refusal to 
recognize certain opinions with restrictions) is that the opinion must be drafted in 
language that is acceptable to the auditor, as well as (or possibly instead of) the client. 
This insistence that the evidential matter itself be created in a form satisfactory to the 
auditor has no apparent justification in the language of SFAS 125 or in the usual GAAS 
standards of field work.
3. Prohibition on the use as evidence of restricted opinions:
The draft explicitly states that “an auditor should not use as evidence” an otherwise 
adequate opinion if the opinion letter restricts the use of its findings to the client or other 
third parties. (¶ 1.15) This, in our view, represents a fundamental misconception of the 
concept of “evidential matter.” Whether the opinion is restricted or not, it constitutes 
evidential matter. This, it appears to us, is an attempt on the part of the auditor to require 
a direct representation by the attorney to readers of the financial statements, rather than 
an attempt to verify—by appropriate audit evidence—the reasonableness of management’s 
representation.
There are a number of major problems with this new, and to our knowledge unique, 
requirement. Most importantly, it places the attorney giving counsel on a transaction in 
the position of advising the world at large, in a liability-assuming letter. The auditor is 
required to determine only whether the client is justified in relying on the opinion. 
Secondly, it creates potentially an issue with respect to the initial drafting of the opinion, 
which by implication must be written with the audit in mind. The typical opinion is 
restricted to the addressee, the client. The client can, of course, show it to the auditor, 
but the lawyer is not opining to the auditor.
4. Exclusive, or near-exclusive, reliance on legal opinion as evidential matter:
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In ¶ 1.17, the draft—though permitting the possibility of other evidence—states that “the 
auditor usually will not be able to obtain persuasive evidence in a form other than a legal 
opinion.” Combined with the other elements of the draft, this clause creates, in our view, 
the real possibility of an untenable position for counsel to a transaction. And, while the 
draft argues that the “isolation aspect of surrender of control is assessed primarily from 
a legal perspective,” it does not make a reasonable argument supporting its ultimate 
conclusion: that the auditor must have an opinion from the attorney to the auditor, in the 
prescribed language, giving direct assurance of isolation.
We appreciate your giving us the opportunity to comment on the Proposed Interpretation. 
We should appreciate an opportunity to meet with you in person to help clarify our 
comments and aid in any drafting improvements to meet our concerns.
Very truly yours
Daniel Goldwasser, Chair,
Abraham M. Stanger 
Task Force Chair
AMS:eun
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Committee on Law and Accounting
Francis T. McGettigan
Deputy Comptroller Corporate Accounting Operation
Tel: (203) 373-2883 / 8*229-2863 3135 Easton Turnpike, W3J, Fairfield, CT 08431
Fax: (203) 373-2441
Monday, December 15, 1997
Ms. Julie Dilley
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
American Institute of CPAs
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: File Reference 2605
Dear Ms. Dilley:
General Electric Company is responding to the AICPA Proposed Interpretation, The Use of Legal 
Interpretations as Evidential Matter to Support Management’s Assertion that a Transfer of 
Financial Assets Qualifies as a Sale.
We object, as a matter of principle, to this proposed interpretation. We believe that it is 
inappropriate for the Auditing Standards Board to propose interpretive guidance that is 
fundamentally an amendment to the authoritative accounting literature (in this case, Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 125). We view this proposed action as setting a 
disturbing precedent for other potential audit concerns that result from unclear or judgmental 
aspects of generally accepted accounting principles.
We therefore recommend that this issue be referred to the FASB for possible issuance of an 
Interpretation or Technical Bulletin that would amend SFAS No. 125. We perceive two 
important benefits to this approach:
• A change of this magnitude should be effected by an amendment to the related FASB 
Statement; that is where preparers of financial statements will expect to find it and its absence 
will risk that many will be unaware of the interpretive position taken.
• The proposed change should be subject to the same robust due process that was associated 
with the original Statement. The basis for conclusions of SFAS No. 125 acknowledges the 
difficulties associated with the isolation criteria and the Board’s view that focusing the 
requirements on “available evidence” would make the standard “workable”. We believe that 
effectively mandating that auditors obtain a legal opinion on the isolation criterion, and further 
specifying that only certain language in that letter would be acceptable, modifies what 
constitutes available evidence. Such a significant modification makes it imperative that the 
Board revisit the issues of practicability and costs associated with a higher standard of 
assurance, a task that, for obvious reasons, is clearly inappropriate for the ASB to consider.
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Finally, on the technical merits of the ASB’s conclusions, we have serious reservations on the 
basis that they present financial statement preparers with a major potential dilemma. Transactions 
that fully meet SFAS No. 125 criteria but not those of the proposed interpretation must result in 
one of two equally untenable outcomes - a qualified or adverse audit opinion if sale accounting is 
used, or financial statements that do not reflect the proper economics or accounting for the deal if 
treated as a financing. We believe that the FASB must resolve this issue.
I should be pleased to discuss any questions you may have regarding these comments.
Sincerely,
Francis T. McGettigan
FTM:sbc
CHEVY CHASE BANK Chevy Chase Bank 8401 Connecticut Avenue 
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20815
December 16, 1997
Ms. Julie Ann Dilley 
Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards 
File 2605 
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Dilley:
Chevy Chase Bank is a $6 billion financial institution headquartered in the Washington, D.C. area and an 
active securitizer of consumer loan receivables. We are pleased that the AICPA has formed a task force to 
develop implementation guidance for SFAS No. 125, however, we are concerned that the current draft of 
that guidance does not adequately address certain issues. We are also concerned about the treatment of 
“single-step” securitizations by banks subject to FDIC receivership. The purpose of this letter is to 
primarily discuss “real life” implementation issues faced by banks with respect to paragraph 9(a) of SFAS 
No. 125.
It is most unfortunate that SFAS No. 125 contains guidance on what constitutes acceptable evidence to 
support an assertion that “assets have been isolated from the transferor.” Moreover, the guidance in 
paragraph 23 has placed auditors in the unenviable position of asking attorneys whether or not a 
transaction should be accounted for as a sale. Attorneys provide their opinions regarding the isolation of 
assets, but to ask them whether a sale has occurred for accounting purposes is backwards.
Securitization transactions are highly structured. Rating agencies, investment bankers, credit enhancers 
and trustees review these transactions to ensure that the structure is sound and that the interests of public 
investors are adequately protected. In the case of private transaction, investors hire their own counsel to 
review the structure. If assets are not properly isolated from the transferor or not put presumptively 
beyond the reach of its creditors, then the structure won’t work, rating agencies won’t rate, enhancers won’t 
enhance, and trustees won’t accept the trust. The assurance in these matters comes from opinions of 
counsel delivered at the time of the transaction which are based on law, facts and circumstances. In light of 
the structure requirements, an additional opinion of counsel seems superfluous. Prior to the implementation 
of SFAS No. 125, the attorneys relied on the accountants regarding sale treatment, now it is the other way 
around.
Moreover, we do not believe that attorneys will render an opinion that a transfer “would” be a sale for 
structures typically used by banks. It seems that the task force has recognized this problem. Paragraph 13 
lists examples of language which are inconsistent with sale treatment. The last bullet, “In our opinion, the 
transfer would either be a sale or...” is footnoted with the statement that “under limited circumstances, this 
[language] may be acceptable for a transferor that is not subject to the U. S. Bankruptcy Code.” However,
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the draft interpretation provides no guidance regarding those limited circumstances. We encourage the task 
force and the AICPA to consider what those circumstances should be, to discuss them with appropriate 
constituents, and to expose them for comment prior to issuing this guidance.
Lastly, we are uncertain of the direction of the discussions regarding “single-step” transfers by banks. As a 
result, we are concerned with the statement that the “Task Force plans to include guidance based on the 
outcome of those discussions in the final interpretation” without exposing for comment a draft of that 
guidance. Most banks securitize loans using a “single-step” structure. A requirement to use a “two-step” 
structure would be devastating to both the banking and securitization industries. Because SFAS No. 125 
applies to current transfers of assets within existing transactions (the so called “revolving period”), such a 
requirement would affect ongoing transfers of assets within existing trusts, impose unnecessary burdens in 
connection with future transactions and effectively nullify previous sale accounting for all outstanding 
transactions that are in their revolving period.
In summary, we are very concerned that the FASB has effectively required banks to demand additional sale 
opinions from their attorneys to determine whether a transaction should or should not be treated as a sale 
for accounting purposes. In structured transactions, attorneys have in the past, and will likely continue to 
render opinions regarding whether assets subject to a transaction have been isolated from the transferor and 
put presumptively beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors at the time of the transaction. Such 
opinions currently satisfy the requirements of all parties to securitization transactions and, as drafted, also 
satisfy the letter of paragraph 9(a) of SFAS No. 125.
Should you have any questions or comments regarding these matters, please feel free to contact me at (301) 
986-6864.
Sincerely,
Joel A. Friedman
 Senior Vice President 
and Controller
JAf/cdb
h:\jaf\document\let97005.lwp
300 Atlantic Street 
P.O. Box 9316 
Stamford, CT 06904
Telephone 203 358
Price Waterhouse llp
December 15, 1997
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Dilley:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed auditing interpretation, The Use of 
Legal Interpretations As Evidential Matter to Support Management’s Assertion That a 
Transfer of Financial Assets Qualifies as a Sale (the “Interpretation”).
The legal aspects of transactions has always impacted accounting and audit matters. Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 125 (SFAS 125), Accounting for Transfers and 
Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, has caused auditors to 
become even more focused on legal structure when evaluating transfers of financial instruments. 
Unfortunately, this heightened awareness and the requirements of SFAS 125 have resulted in 
practice diversity on what audit evidence is necessary to support management’s assertion that a 
financial asset sale has occurred. Generally, that audit evidence debate has centered on the need 
for and content of legal letters.
The Interpretation resolves several aspects of the legal letter controversy and we support the 
guidance therein. Equally important, however, is that the SFAS 125 Audit Issues Task Force 
(the “Task Force”) continue its work, as indicated in your cover letter, and pursue timely 
resolution of the audit evidence issues related to transactions of institutions subject to FDIC 
receivership. In addition, we have the following comments on specific paragraphs of the 
Interpretation:
1. Paragraph .07: We believe that an auditor should test management’s assertion that the new 
structure is the same as the prior one before evaluating the need for an update of the legal 
letter issued for the prior structure.
2. Paragraphs .16-.17: Our suggestion is to split this question and interpretation into two 
questions with separate interpretations. The first question should address the lack of 
persuasive evidence in a legal letter and the second question should focus on when the legal 
specialist does not grant permission for the auditor to use a legal opinion. When presented 
together as one question, the interpretation seems less clear.
Ms. Julie Anne Dilley 
Page 2
December 15, 1997
We look forward to working with the Task Force in the future and would be pleased to discuss 
our comments with you.
Sincerely,
Securities Industry Association
1401 Eye Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-2225, (202) 296-9410, Fax (202) 296-9775 
info@sia.com, http://www.sia.com
December 16, 1997
Julie Anne Dilley
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: November 24, 1997 Draft of Proposed AU Section 9336; File No. 2605
Dear Ms. Dilley:
Thank you for giving the Capital Committee of the Securities Industry 
Association ("SIA")1 the opportunity to respond to the above-referenced working draft of 
a proposed audit interpretation of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 73, Using the 
Work of a Specialist (“Draft Interpretation”). We understand that the Draft Interpretation 
is being considered by the FASB 125 Audit Issues Task Force ("Task Force") of the 
Audit Standards Board ("ASB"). The intended purpose of the draft is to provide 
guidance regarding the use of a legal specialist's finding as audit evidence to support 
Management’s assertion that a transfer of financial assets meets the legal isolation 
criterion of paragraph 9(a) of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards ("SFAS") No. 
125, "Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of 
Liabilities." The Committee takes great interest in SFAS 125 and other accounting 
pronouncements inasmuch as the basis for most regulatory computations is data prepared 
under generally accepted accounting principles.
We believe that, in its current form, the Draft Interpretation requires a level of 
legal assurance that is likely to be, as a practical matter, unattainable or extremely 
difficult to obtain in many instances. This strictness, in turn, will deter many 
commonplace securities transactions that have long been treated as sales. In addition, we
1 The Securities Industry Association brings together the shared interests of more than 770
securities firms throughout North America to accomplish common goals. SIA members — including 
investment banks, broker-dealers, and mutual fund companies — are active in all markets and in all phases 
of corporate and public finance. In the U.S. SIA members collectively account for approximately 90 
percent, or $100 billion, of securities firms' revenues and employ about 350,000 individuals. They manage 
the accounts of more than 50-million investors directly and tens of millions of investors indirectly through 
corporate, thrift and pension plans. More information about SIA is available at our Internet web site, 
http://www.sia.com.
120 Broadway, New York, NY 10271-0080, (212) 608-1500, Fax (212) 608-1604
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believe that, as currently written, the Draft Interpretation is inconsistent with certain of 
the key provisions of SFAS 125.2
I. Specific Concerns With the Draft Interpretation.
The Draft Interpretation Sets an Impracticably High Standard for Legal 
Comfort and Would Significantly Hinder Well-Established Types of Securities
Transactions. The Draft Interpretation effectively requires that in order to book any 
“non-routine” transaction as a sale under paragraph 9(a) of SFAS 125, management must 
obtain an opinion letter of counsel stating the lawyer’s belief that the transfer “would be 
considered to be a sale” under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Counsel advises us that there 
is little case law with respect to the bankruptcy status of transactions covered by SFAS 
125 upon which a lawyer could base a “would” opinion.3 Moreover, for many types of 
transactions, different lawyers may come to different legal conclusions as to whether a 
“would” standard is satisfied. A less severe standard, more in line with current practice 
(whether a “more likely than not” standard or some similar articulation), would increase 
the likelihood that firms will account for similar transactions in a consistent manner.
The draft states that “the auditor usually will not be able to obtain persuasive 
evidence in a form other than a legal opinion” and that “conclusions about hypothetical 
transactions may not be relevant to the transaction that is the subject of management’s 
assertions....” We question this view in two respects. First, we believe that there may 
be occasions when other facts, such as regulatory approval or guidance, can be sufficient 
to demonstrate that the isolation criteria have been met.
Second, the practical effect of this view would be to require an opinion letter for a 
vast number of transactions, such as securitizations, for which they have not been 
required until now. We believe that auditors should not be required to obtain a legal 
opinion for every transaction. Rather, in many instances, it should be sufficient for 
auditors to require that a determination has been made that a particular transaction fits 
within the assumptions made in a prior opinion or legal memorandum.4 Auditors should
2 SIA's concern about the serious adverse effect that the Draft Interpretation could have on the 
securities markets is widely held. In spite of the fact that the Draft Interpretation was only circulated just 
prior to Thanksgiving, allowing only 12 business days for the industry to respond, SI A has been advised 
that a number of securities firms and at least one other trade association plan to respond. This high 
response rate to an interpretation that the ASB itself acknowledges has relatively remote authority is highly 
indicative of widely held concerns about the business implications of the interpretation.
3 We understand that the Bond Market Association plans to discuss extensively the current trends in 
the case law in this area. To avoid redundancy, we refer you to that letter for more information on this 
point.
4 Such a determination would not necessarily have to be made by a lawyer, so long as the person 
making the determination is able to give the auditors comfort that the transaction is encompassed within the 
assumptions made in a prior opinion letter or legal memorandum.
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have the same latitude under SFAS 125 that they have in applying other accounting 
standards, such as FIN 39, to make judgments as to what evidence is required to support 
an audit determination.
The Committee believes that the effect of requiring “would” opinions would be to 
discourage or curtail many structured transactions. The reason for this is two-fold. First, 
because of the impracticality of obtaining such a high level of legal comfort, broker- 
dealers would be forced to carry transactions on their books that otherwise would be on 
their books only under very remote circumstances (i.e., a bankruptcy of the broker-dealer 
coupled with the failure of a legal comfort letter). The “would” approach poses even 
greater concerns for non-U.S. affiliates of U.S. financial institutions. We understand that 
there is currently varying practice with respect to providing “would” opinions in many 
foreign jurisdictions. The failure of non-U.S. lawyers to accommodate the terms of the 
interpretation draft would be yet another impediment that the Draft interpretation would 
pose to many transactions.
Second, in many instances in which transactions are still undertaken, there will be 
undue legal and regulatory consequences. For example, in some situations there could be 
a significant possibility that a broker dealer would be compelled to record a sale on its 
balance sheet, while a counter-party broker-dealer would also record the same assets on 
its balance sheet.5 As a result of this double-counting, both sides of transactions may be 
required to take capital charges on the same assets, potentially diminishing broker- 
dealers’ ability or desire to provide market liquidity. Consequently, as currently drafted, 
the Draft Interpretation would create unnecessary and undesirable obstacles to 
transactions that are integral to the modem securities markets.6
The Draft Interpretation Is Inconsistent With Standards Set Out in SFAS 
125. While the exact nature of evidentiary matter that can satisfy Paragraph 9(a) is not 
entirely clear, the Committee believes that SFAS 125 does not require that legal comfort 
must come in the form of a legal opinion, and, to our knowledge, the FASB has not put 
forward such a restrictive requirement. The relevant provisions of SFAS 125 suggest that 
no particular form of legal comfort is required in all situations. Paragraph 9(a) requires 
that “the transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor - put presumptively
For example, for certain types of sales, (e.g., structured transactions) bankruptcy case law is scarce 
or non-existent. Since a “would” opinion in such areas is likely to be unobtainable, the selling broker- 
dealer and the receiving broker-dealer might both have to carry assets on their books.
6 For example, a “would” opinion might be impossible to obtain for an asset sale coupled with a
total return swap, because there currently is no bankruptcy case law on this type of transaction. However, 
if this compels sellers to carry such assets on their balance sheets, it becomes more probable that if a 
bankruptcy involving such assets ever does occur, a court might conclude from the fact that the asset 
remained on the seller’s balance sheet that there was not an intent to sell.
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beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other 
receivership” (emphasis added). Paragraph 23 states that the evidence needed to support 
a determination that financial assets have been isolated in this manner depends on the 
facts and circumstances. Paragraph 23 concludes with the statement that “derecognition 
of transferred assets is appropriate only if the available evidence provides reasonable 
assurance that the transferred assets would be beyond the reach of the powers of a 
bankruptcy trustee or other receiver for the transferor or any of its affiliates ....” 
(emphasis added).7
In contrast, paragraphs .12 and .13 of the Draft Interpretation suggest that the 
form of legal assurance must be the highest possible assurance - that the transfer of 
financial assets “would be” considered a sale, and therefore not deemed to be property of 
the seller’s estate in bankruptcy, or “would not” result in a court order consolidating the 
assets and liabilities of the purchaser with those of the seller. Paragraph .13 specifically 
rejects less strict formulations of opinion language, such as “reasonable possibility,” 
“reasonable basis to conclude.” “should,” “more likely than not,” “would presumptively 
be,” and “it is probable that.”8 *
The Committee believes that the emphasis in these provisions of the Draft 
Interpretation on the need for a “would” opinion is much more inflexible than is 
suggested by the italicized words from SFAS 125 set out above. We believe SFAS 125 
contemplates a number of levels of possible formulations of the strength of the legal 
opinion that must be obtained to satisfy paragraph 9(a). Paragraph 9(a) uses the word 
“presumptively”. Similarly, paragraph 23 uses the terms “would likely” and “reasonable 
assurances that assets would,” and Paragraph 118 refers to assurances acceptable to rating 
agencies, which do not typically require “would” opinions.
The Draft Interpretation is Inconsistent With Audit Practice Regarding 
Similar Accounting Standards. In other circumstances involving the accounting 
treatment for significant financial transactions, FASB pronouncements have not been 
understood to require a “would” opinion from counsel. In particular, SFAS 5, SFAS 109, 
FIN 39 and FIN 41 are, like SFAS 125, FASB pronouncements (some of them quite 
recent) that address the legal comfort that is appropriate for accounting treatment.
7 Paragraph 118 is the only provision of SFAS 125 that suggests that any particular form of legal 
assurance is required. That paragraph only states that the FASB developed its criteria for Paragraph 9(a) 
“in large part” with reference to rated securitization practices, and that “credit rating agencies and investors 
.. . sometimes seek assurances from attorneys” (emphasis added) about the bankruptcy status of special 
purpose vehicles and securitized assets.
8 Paragraph .12 of the Draft Interpretation assumes that “persuasive evidence” is the standard that
supporting evidence of isolation must satisfy. We respectfully suggest that Paragraph 23 of SFAS 125 
strongly suggests that the appropriate standard is “reasonable assurance.”
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However, we understand that none of these pronouncements require a “would” opinion.9 
It is difficult to see why a higher standard of reasonable assurance should be taken in 
connection with isolation of assets under SFAS 125 than, for example, under FIN 39.10
II. Suggested Changes to Draft Interpretation.
Consistent with our comments above, we believe that the following changes 
would address some of our concerns:
.05, second sentence. Change to “use of a legal specialist often [strike usually] is 
necessary.”
.12, first sentence. Strike “persuasive evidence” and replace with “reasonable 
assurance.”
.12, first and second indented paragraph. Strike italicized “would” and replace 
with “should.”
.13. Strike “persuasive evidence” in first and second sentences and replace with 
“reasonable assurance.”
.13. In the list of sample phrases that would not provide reasonable assurance, 
strike the third, fourth, sixth, eighth, ninth and tenth bulleted phrases.
.13. Strike footnote 6.
. 16. Strike “persuasive evidence” and replace with “reasonable assurance.”
.17. In the second sentence, strike “the auditor usually will not be able to obtain 
persuasive evidence” and replace with “often will not be able to obtain reasonable 
assurance.” In the third sentence strike “persuasive evidence” and replace with 
“reasonable assurance.”
9 Our understanding is that under these pronouncements, legal comfort (whether an opinion letter of 
other legal memoranda) providing a “more likely than not” assurance has been widely accepted as 
sufficient.
10 FIN 39 states that “[offsetting is appropriate only if the available evidence, both positive and 
negative, indicates that there is a reasonable assurance that the right of setoff would be upheld in 
bankruptcy.” It would be difficult to construe this language as generally mandating a “would” opinion of 
counsel.
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Conclusion.
Again, the Committee very much appreciates the opportunity to comment on the 
Draft Interpretation. If you have questions about this letter or we can be of further 
assistance, please contact the undersigned at 212-902-1360 (or via e-mail at 
mark.holloway@gs.com), or contact the Committee’s staff adviser, George Kramer, at 
202-296-9410 or at gkramer@sia.com.
Sincerely,
Mark W. Holloway 
Chairman
SIA Capital Committee
cc: Michael H. Sutton, SEC Chief Accountant
Richard Lindsey, Director, SEC Division of Market Regulation 
Michael Macchiaroli, Associate Director, SEC Division of Market
Regulation
Michael Helmick, President, SIA Financial Management Division 
Capital Committee members.
